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Abstract 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has become focused on 
developing the capability to rapidly respond to emerging crises.  Strategic and operation 
planning play key roles in order to effectively implement this concept.  During the 
planning process, separate courses of action (COAs) are developed.  These COAs are 
evaluated based upon their operational effect, resource availability, nuclear and 
transportation feasibility.   
 Currently, transportation feasibility assessments are based on the resources 
contained within a full Unit Type Code (UTC).  Some COAs are eliminated based on 
these factors.  However, most deployments occur at reduced levels.  Situational factors, 
such as the number of aircraft, type of deployment, duration of the deployment, and 
availability of resources from other locations, can significantly reduce the logistics 
footprint of a deploying base. 
 Additionally, full-UTC planning factors reduce the planner’s knowledge of airlift 
requirements until information regarding tailoring is returned from the base.  As a result, 
precious time is consumed, and potentially favorable COAs may be eliminated 
erroneously. 
 By developing a forecasting tool to identify the critical factors in tailoring, and 
their effect on the size of the package deployed, planners can quickly evaluate 
deployment scenarios, providing more accurate assessments regarding plan feasibility 
and transportation supportability. 
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ESTIMATING RESOURCES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MULTI-ECHELON F-15 
DEPLOYMENTS 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
 
            During the Cold War, the United States military planning philosophy was 
centered on large conflicts with significant build up time.  However, with the fall of the 
Soviet Union and with instability in many areas of the world, the United States has 
become focused on developing the capability to rapidly respond to emerging crises.   
 Efficient strategic and operational planning are key factors in developing the 
ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises.  To foster rapid deployment, many planning 
tools and processes have been developed.  However,  Air Force planners do not have a 
tool to estimate the amount of cargo and the number of personnel required to support 
different quantities and types of given weapons systems.   
 Currently, planners are forced to tailor generic Unit Type Codes (UTC) to meet 
the requirements of the mission at hand.  When weapon systems are tasked at sub-UTC 
levels, support planners do not have the tools required to estimate the cargo and 
passengers that they need to support the tasked package.  The result is a lack of 
predictability regarding the amount of resources during the operation.  This lack of 
predictability hinders the ability to effectively plan in short periods of time.  
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 Models proposed by the Rand Corporation produced cargo packages for F-15 
deployments based on decision rule processes.  These decision rules attempted to 
accomplish UTC tailoring automatically, based on various input factors.  However, these 
models have methodological issues that hinder their use in developing resource 
estimations. 
 In order to understand the contents of a deployment package, a model must be 
developed to accurately describe historical deployment requirements.  This model can 
provide resource estimations, and can also serve as a baseline for future endeavors into 
automated resource estimation tools. 
Problem Statement 
 
 Decision makers at all levels need to have access to realistic support 
requirements, tailored to the quantity of weapon systems required by the current mission.  
There is a large quantity of data regarding what was actually deployed to support an array 
of weapon systems.  These data can be used to create a model that provides near-
instantaneous support estimates, facilitating the planning process.  The purpose of this 
research is to collect and analyze this data to develop a model to estimate the resources 
required to support a given number, of a given type of airframe. 
Research Question 
 Can deployment processes be improved by providing a model to predict the resources required to 
support F-15E deployments under different scenarios?  
Investigative Questions 
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 In order to meet the goals of this research, it is necessary to answer the following 
questions: 
1) What are the significant factors determining the number of passengers and amount of 
cargo required to support a deployment? 
2) How effective have previous models been in estimating real-world deployment 
requirements? 
 A) What are the models underlying assumptions? 
 B) Do the models’ outputs properly predict the composition of actual 
deployments?  
3) Can a model be constructed that is more robust than existing models? 
4) What factors must future models account for to produce effective estimates? 
5) What precision and significance can a regression model provide regarding resource 
estimations? 
Research Methodology 
 
 The methodology used in the research was a two-level investigation based on data 
collected from the 1St Logistics Readiness Squadron, Langley, Virginia and the 48th 
Logistics Readiness Squadron, RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom.  The data was 
collected form historical deployment files, and was coded by the number of deploying 
aircraft, the short tons of cargo deployed, the number of passengers deployed, whether 
the deployment was for Air Expeditionary Force or other activities, the composition of 
the deployed location (aggregating with other aircraft versus not aggregating), and the 
planned duration of the deployment. 
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 The data gathered in the original data collection period (32 points) was then used 
to develop two regression models.  The first measured the effect of the number of 
deploying aircraft, the type of location, and the type of deployment on the number of 
passengers deployed.  The second regression model measured the effect of the number of 
deploying aircraft, the type of location, and the type of deployment on the short tons of 
cargo deployed.   
 Finally, the models were validated for their ability to significantly predict 
resource requirements, and the precision with which their predictions actually reflect real 
requirements.  This validation occurred with 15 data points gathered during a secondary 
data collection. 
Scope and Limitations 
 
 This research only deals with F-15 aircraft, and does not apply to other airframes.  
Rather, this investigation attempts to establish a methodology that could be applied to 
other necessary combat platforms (tanks, airframes, hospitals, depots, etc).  Additionally, 
this model does not account for items deployed from another location to support an F-15 
package (barriers, Major Command support, etc.) As a result, this model will not, by 
itself, provide a robust tool to facilitate planning of a diverse deployment package. 
 This research does not specifically account for items that are available at the 
deployed site, such as water, fuel, vehicles, etc.  However, this model’s scope is to 
predict the resources required to move from the deploying location.  The model is able to 
perform despite this limitation. 
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 This methodology does not give exact resource estimations, but provides a 
flexible range for planners to use when planning to mobilize forces.  As a result, the 
model does not provide specifics regarding what resources will be deployed, only an 
aggregate estimation regarding how much is required. 
 Finally, this research investigates the resources required from the deploying 
location, and does not assess the resources required to support downrange operations.  
For example, if fuel is purchased locally, it is not a resource required from the deploying 
location, however, it is still a resource required at the deployed location.  Thus this model 
as developed would have to be combined with other information to estimate the resources 
required to support an F-15 deployment.
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
 
 This chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to this research effort.  It 
begins with an explanation of the different types of joint planning: Deliberate and Crisis 
Action.  The Department of Defense’s Joint Planning Model follows, which explains the 
merging of the two types of joint planning into a single process.  A description of Air 
Force planning follows, explaining manpower and equipment force packages, included 
within the Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging System (MEFPAK).  The process 
of tailoring UTCs during Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning is described, including 
key variables considered in the tailoring process.  Finally, a description of previous 
attempts to estimate deployment resource requirements is provided.  An investigation of 
these models establishes the need to describe historical deployment resource 
requirements. 
Background 
 As the Air Force transitions to capabilities-based planning, the need for rapid, 
accurate planning increases.  In order to compare multiple scenarios for logistics 
feasibility, rapid forecasts for operational packages must be available.  These forecasts 
allow for rapid selection of a feasible course of action when responding to arising crises. 
 There are numerous factors that impact the composition of resource packages 
required to support an operational package.  These factors are considered when a joint 
plan is developed, and affect the size and selection for a resource package. 
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 Many attempts have been made to automate and hasten the planning process.  
These attempts have had limited success, limiting their applicability when trying to 
estimate resource requirements tailored to a specific scenario.  These efforts will be 
detailed in the literature review. 
Joint Planning 
 The task of planning and mobilizing the four military services in response to an 
arising crisis is critical to the defense of our national interests.  To guide the process, the 
Department of Defense has created a complex architecture designed to facilitate planning 
for a wide range of scenarios with varying planning horizons.  Two types of plans are 
central to joint planning, deliberate and crisis action plans.  They provide a means to 
respond to immediate crises, and plan for anticipated crises that may arise in the future.  
The joint planning process provides a framework to consider the output of each type of 
planning into an executable plan. 
 Deliberate Planning 
 Deliberate Planning involves speculation of the nature and location of a threat that 
may develop.  Deliberate Planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint 
operation plans for contingencies in accordance with national strategic policy (Logistics 
Readiness Officer Logistics Plans Module, 2003:20). 
 The Deliberate Planning process is initiated when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
issue the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JCSP).  This plan assigns tasks and resources, 
identifies broad scenarios for planning, and guides the strategic planning effort (Logistics 
Readiness Officer Logistics Plans Module, 2003:24).        
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 The planning process continues by assigning a supported commander, that is, a 
commander who will be required to implement the plan should the need arise.  The 
supported commander issues a Letter of Intent (LOI) which identifies the agencies 
involved in the planning process.   
After the LOI is issued, a Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is developed 
based on guidance and requirements identified by the supported commander.  The 
TPFDD identifies forces that supporting commanders must provide to successfully 
implement the plan.  These force capabilities are represented by Unit Type Codes, a five 
letter alphanumeric code that contains a mission description and the resources required to 
accomplish that mission.  Additionally, the TPFDD identifies which units will provide 
the required forces and the timeline that must be followed.  The TPFDD is a living 
document that is refined continually during the planning process. (see Figure 1)     
   
Figure 1- Deliberate Planning Process (LRO Log Plans Course, 2003:21) 
   Once the resources required to support a plan are determined, transportation 
feasibility is assessed to identify constraints which may affect the plan.  After a plan is 
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determined to be transportable, supporting commanders identify limitations, to be either 
resolved by utilizing resources from another supporting commander, or identified as 
shortfalls, which will be reported to the JCS.  Once the limitations have been resolved, 
the plan is submitted to the JCS for final review. 
 The two most frequent outputs of the Deliberate Planning process are Operations 
Plans (Oplans) and Concept Plans (ConPlans).  Oplans are plans that direct the conduct 
of military operations.  They contain a complete listing of supporting plans and 
appendices, and also have a supporting Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) 
listing.  Oplans are more specific and detailed than ConPlans. 
 A ConPlan contains fully developed statements of mission, situation, 
assumptions, and concepts of operations.  ConPlans tend to contain well defined 
statements of mission, situation, assumptions, and concepts of operations.  However, they 
usually do not contain detailed support requirements or detailed flow of resources. 
 The goal of Deliberate Planning is to identify resources required to accomplish 
our National Strategic Objective, and to hasten response planning when actual 
contingencies arise.  However, it is important to note that in Deliberate Planning, time is 
not a restrictive factor, and most plans are developed in 18 to 24 months. 
 Crisis Action Planning     
 Crisis Action Planning occurs when military intervention is required due to an 
emerging crisis.  A crisis is defined in Joint Pub 5-03.1 as  
“an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States’ vital interests that 
develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or 
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military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated 
to achieve national objectives.” (Joint Pub 5-03.1, 1997:21) 
  
 Crisis Action Planning occurs when a situation arises that requires immediate 
military intervention.  During the initial stages of the plan, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) assesses the situation.  The CJCS then discusses the situation with 
the National Security Council (NSC), which is composed of the President, the Vice 
President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.  Together they decide 
whether or not military intervention may be required, and in what capacity it would be 
used.   
 Once the CJCS and NSC identify potential courses of action (COAs) that require 
analysis, the CJCS issues a Warning Order that contains a description of the threat and 
the potential COAs.  The resources and requirements of each COA are then assessed.  
Due to time restrictions, this assessment may not entail the development of complete 
TPFDDs and transportation feasibility studies of actual resource requirements.  The 
supported commander consolidates inputs from all of the involved agencies and 
determines the best course of action.  The consolidated plan is submitted to the NSC for 
review, and becomes executable when the NSC issues an Execution Order. 
 The nature of Crisis Action Planning is a response posture.  In contrast with 
Deliberate Planning, time is a critical factor in Crisis Action Planning.  In response to 
unexpected contingencies, multiple courses of action must be developed and analyzed 
within hours or days.  This need for accurate planning within a small timeframe requires 
accurate tools to rapidly estimate deployment support requirements in a short amount of 
time.   
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 Joint Planning Process 
 As contingencies arise, they may or may not have been anticipated or planned for.  
Thus, during the development of potential courses of action, a suitable deliberate plan 
may or may not be present.  The result is a requirement to have a consolidated joint 
planning process that allows for planning to occur either by modifying a Deliberate Plan 
or by creating a new plan through Crisis Action Planning. 
 Figure 2 shows the consolidated planning process that the Department of 
Defenses uses during contingency response. 
 
Figure 2. Joint Planning Process (AFMAN 10-403, 2003:9) 
 Figure 2 details the relationship between Crisis Action Planning and Deliberate 
Planning.  Oplans and ConPlans, if available, developed in the Deliberate Planning 
process are expanded or modified to generate particular courses of action.  If no Oplans 
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or ConPlans exist in relation to the crisis, then Crisis Action Planning occurs to generate 
courses of action.  In either case, once the proper course of action has been selected, an 
Execution Order is issued.   
 An important system that serves as an enabler for the entire planning and 
execution system is the Joint Operating Planning and Execution System (JOPES).  
“JOPES is a combination of joint policies and procedures (guidance), and Automated 
Data Procedures (ADP) support used to plan and execute joint military operations (User’s 
Guide, 1995:3).”  According to the User’s Guide for JOPES (1995), the system 
standardizes the terminology and operating procedures used by each service into one 
standard multifaceted system.  JOPES is used in both Deliberate and Crisis Action 
Planning processes to ensure that service capabilities and requirements are all accounted 
for in a standardized fashion.  This effort integrates each service’s efforts into a single 
system used to execute multi-Service exercises and operations.  
 In addition, JOPES serves as an Automated Data Processing tool.  It supports the 
planning process by integrating a network of systems that enable planners to estimate 
potential deployment requirements based on Unit Type Code (UTC) taskings, to track 
items during the duration of the deployment and to manage redeployment operations as 
well.  According to the JOPES User’s Guide,  
“JOPES uses a set of command and control techniques and processes, supported by a 
computerized information system, to ensure the right amount of timely support gets to the 
war fighter to ensure a decisive victory (User’s Guide; 1995:3).” 
 The UTCs contained in JOPES are not tailored.  That is, they contain the largest 
resource level that could possibly be developed to support a deployment.  Thus when the 
planning factors are identified during the construction of COAs, planners tend to 
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overstate the movement requirement.  This presents a skewed transportation feasibility 
analysis. 
Air Force Planning  
 As Joint Planning directives move down the chain of command, the Air Force 
implements its own specific planning process in order to fulfill supported commander 
requirements.  This section begins with the Air Force Planning Process.  This is the 
process that the Air Force uses to translate Joint Planning Process output into a plan that 
is service-specific. 
 Air Force Planning Process 
 The Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) is the tool used to translate 
JSCP requirements into Air Force plans and capabilities.  The WMP is composed of five 
volumes (Logistics’ Readiness Officer Course, 2003:26). 
 The first WMP volume provides planners with general policies and guidance for 
the development of war plans and the support of combat forces during wartime.  This 
section addresses the nature of the mission, the concept of operations, and execution 
tasks for Air Forces throughout the world.   
 The second volume identifies all of the joint plans which require Air Force 
participation.  This serves as a master listing of all possible taskings that the Air Force 
could receive in the bodies of existing plans. 
 The third volume serves as a master listing of all Unit Type Codes (UTCs) and 
their associated Mission Capability Statements (MISCAPs).  All of the UTCs listed in the 
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MEFPAK are also listed in this chapter.  This provides planners with an accessible listing 
of options that can be used when developing new plans or reviewing existing plans.    
 The fourth volume of the WMP details the current state of MAJCOM planning, 
positioning, and employment activity of aviation forces tasked in support of Oplans.  This 
provides a picture the current location of forces, and what missions they are serving.   
 The fifth volume provides wartime sortie and attrition rates and sortie duration for 
each type of aircraft and potential mission. Additionally, it provides consumption rates 
for items such as fuel, oil, lubricants, rations and other mission critical logistics support. 
 The WMP provides planners with visibility of the planning process, the current 
resources available to the Air Force, the taskings that currently engage our forces, and the 
amount of support required to sustain operations for a given period of time.  This 
information plays an important part in enabling the Air Force to provide planning in 
accordance with JOPES procedures and JSCP requirements.   
 Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging System  
 According to Air Force Manual 10-401 the MEFPAK “is the process for 
developing and describing standard, predefined manpower and equipment force packages 
and determining the deployment characteristics of these packages in support of JOPES” 
(AFMAN 10-401, 2003: 93).   
 The MEFPAK was designed to provide planners with standardized descriptions of 
unit capabilities.  These descriptions facilitate the deliberate and crisis action planning 
processes by blending the capability of a unit’s resources with a plan requirement.  Force 
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capability packages are identified in MEFPAK using unit type codes (UTCs).  The terms 
force package and UTC are often used synonymously.   
 UTCs are comprised of two major components.  The first is called the Manpower 
Force Packaging System (MANFOR).  This contains a listing of all of the personnel 
required to satisfy the force capability. The second major component of a UTC is the 
Logistics Force Packaging System (LOGFOR).  This is a listing of all of the equipment 
required to successfully support a given force capability.  While some UTCs do not have 
associated MANFOR or LOGFOR components, all UTCs are a blend of resources 
required to provide a specified force capability.  They are registered in the MEFPAK 
listing and become a standard component for use in Air Force planning.  
 F-15E MEFPAK Descriptions 
 The MEFPAK provides a listing of all deployable UTCs owned by the Air Force.  
This listing shows that planners deploy Air Force F-15E aircraft using a three-increment 
methodology.  In addition to the core F-15E packages, other UTCs are often tasked as 
supporting UTCs.   
 The first increment of an F-15E deployment is a 12 ship UTC (3FQL1 or 3FQM1 
depending on the engine type).  This package provides 12 deploying F-15E aircraft, and 
the associated standard support UTCs required to support them. 
 Since aircraft requirements are not linear in nature, an initial follow-on 6 ship 
(3FQL2 or 3FQM2) is used, along with additional standard support UTCs.  This package 
contains the resources that must be added to support six additional aircraft, creating a 
package of 18, versus 12 aircraft.  Since, some required support for the initial follow-on 
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6-ship is contained in the 12-ship support UTCs, resulting in a package that is 
proportionally smaller than the initial 12-ship package.   
 Finally, a second follow-on 6 ship package (3FQL3 of 3FQM3) and associated 
support is designed to raise the force numbers from 18 to 24 ships.  This package 
contains mostly pilots and crews, since there is very little additional support equipment 
required.  
 Many of the supporting UTCs are standard, identified as such in volume 3 of the 
WMP.  Standard support packages include the maintenance and support necessary for 
sustaining operations.  However, many support UTCs are not standard.  Non-standard 
support UTCs are added to a package based on local factors (i.e. the experience of the 
planner or unique mission needs).  The size and number of UTCs selected to deploy 
varies depending on the size and nature of the deployment (Snyder and Mills, 2004:6). 
 Expeditionary Air Forces (EAF) 
 During the Cold War, the USAF was “primarily poised to respond to conflict in 
the most volatile arenas of the time: Europe or the Korean Peninsula “(Galway et al, 
2001:7).  With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, a change in readiness was required.  
Planning became focused on rapid deployments with global reach, enabling forces to 
respond to emerging threats and smaller conflicts (Vo, 1997:12).   This led to the creation 
of the Expeditionary Air Forces in 1994. 
The EAF “concept is how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains itself by 
creating a mindset and cultural state that embraces the unique characteristics of aerospace 
power – range, speed, flexibility, and precision – to meet the national security challenges 
of the 21st Century. The concept has two fundamental principles: first, to provide trained 
and ready aerospace forces for national defense, and second, to meet national 
commitments.” (AFI 10-400, 2002:6)  
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 The EAF represents the entire Air Force inventory, and is divided into ten Air 
Expeditionary Forces (AEFs).  AEFs contain “Fighter, Bomber, Airlift, Tanker, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance units (that) are on-call or deployed for 
one  
4-month rotation during each 20-month cycle” (AEF Course, 2003) (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. An Example AEF Cycle- Cycle 5 (AEF Course, 2003) 
 Each rotation is composed of two AEFs, postured to deploy to two separate 
locations in support of the NSAs multi-theatre war doctrine.  One cycle is composed of a 
20 months period where all AEFs have been postured to deploy.   
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 Since the AEF is a response mechanism with a long planning horizon (typically 
14-months), it lies somewhere between Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning.  Like the 
Deliberate Planning Process, AEF planning has a long planning horizon, but is used to 
respond to a contingency without the revisions common to the Joint Planning Process.  
Additionally, the long lead time results in a higher level of airlift planning.  By enabling 
airlift to be programmed far in advance, it has a higher probability of receiving airlift 
support.   
UTC Tailoring in the Joint Planning Process 
 
 UTCs are generic packages designed to represent the maximum package size 
required to support a given force capability.  Resources are often trimmed from the 
package to meet the needs of the mission at hand.  This activity is known as tailoring.   
 Tailoring cannot begin until UTCs have been selected based on operational 
requirements.  However, equipment and personnel cannot be prepared for deployment 
until unit planners have tailored their UTCs, and in cooperation with MAJCOM and 
USTRANSCOM, acquired sufficient transportation to mobilize their package. 
 During the execution phase of the Joint Planning Process, multiple possible 
Courses of Action (COAs) are developed.  Within each COA, force capabilities required 
to successfully achieve the goals (established by the NSC) are identified in terms of 
untailored UTCs.  Each plan is then evaluated for force strength and transportation 
feasibility.  Once feasibility has been ascertained for each plan, a favorable plan is 
selected to begin implementation.  
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 After a plan is selected, a TPFDD is created in JOPES.  This TPFDD identifies 
not only the force capabilities required, but the units tasked to supply those capabilities.  
Unit planners work with Major Command (MAJCOM) planners to garner information 
regarding the nature of the scenario.  This information is used to determine which 
equipment or personnel contained in the UTC are actually needed to accomplish the 
mission.  Once this is accomplished, unit level planners determine feasibility of their 
plan.  If sufficient resources are available, they notify MAJCOM planners who source 
transportation through United States Transportation Command (HQ USTRANSCOM).    
 HQ USTRANSCOM sources airlift using the tailored deployment data developed 
by the units, and coordinated through the MAJCOMs.  If insufficient airlift is available, 
TRANSCOM notifies the MAJCOM that further tailoring is required.  This iterative 
process occurs until airlift is sourced for the deploying unit.  This process occurs late in 
the planning window, close to the point of execution.   
 During most deployment scenarios, the force capability provided within a 
UTC contains resources not required to accomplish the mission at hand.  In these 
cases, resources are removed (tailored) from the package.  If the support provided 
by the UTC closely matches the resources required by the scenario, then tailoring 
may be minimal, or not required.   
However, if the tasking is “non-standard” (for example: fewer aircraft or people in to an 
unplanned environment/location, or in an otherwise constrained situation that doesn’t 
already exist in a Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN), tailoring becomes a major workload 
requiring a significant increase in validation, coordination, and computer input activities.  
Again, numerous hours can be spent in refining the logistics and manpower files. 
(Leftwich et al., 1997:17-21). 
 During Crisis Action Planning, these additional planning hours are 
precious when a scenario emerges requiring mobilization within 48 hours.  The 
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importance of rapid estimations during execution becomes magnified because 
mobility operations cannot begin until tailoring is completed.  Additionally, “the 
amount of airlift available is relatively constant (and very limited), so the size of 
the deployment package determines how many units can be moved at once” 
(Griffis and Martin, 1996:9).  As a result, plans using a full-UTC planning factor 
overestimate the required airlift.  A plan may be dismissed as unfeasible if HQ 
USTRANSCOM or Air Mobility Command determine that there is insufficient 
airlift to move the appropriate units in a timely manner.   
 “An analytical methodology to shorten this time frame would…expedite 
crisis action planning, reducing the response time to exigencies” (Snyder and 
Mills, 2004:2).  By creating a rapid estimation tool, different potential COAs can 
be quickly analyzed for feasibility, reducing the time required for planning and 
increasing the time allowed for execution. 
 An estimation tool could also improve the Deliberate Planning Process.  
Precise resource forecasts during Deliberate Planning would create more accurate 
TPFDDs.  If a crisis emerged requiring activation of an Oplan, an accurate 
TPFDD would reduce the time required to modify the existing plan into an 
actionable plan.  Snyder concurs with the notion that a planning estimator can 
enhance the Deliberate Planning Process. 
“operational planners could explore candidate deployment plans to estimate the 
manpower and material needed across all deployment sites.  A comparison might be used 
to dismiss one plan in favor of another based on logistical efficiencies” (Snyder and 
Mills, 2004:41). 
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 Since transportation feasibility assessments are negatively impacted by full-UTC 
estimations, a tool that could more accurately predict resource requirements would 
improve the ability to rapidly plan effective responses.  By predicting resource 
requirements early in the process, feasible COAs and airlift requirements could be 
developed at USTRANSCOM before TPFDD data were sent to the MAJCOMs and to the 
affected bases.  This would allow more time for airlift sourcing by ensuring that early 
iterations of the TPFDD accurately estimate the package after tailoring occurs at the 
MAJCOM and the base. 
Relevant Variables in UTC Tailoring 
 
 UTCs are resource listings that include the maximum amount of resources 
required to support a given package.  However, there are many factors that may reduce 
the logistics resources required to support a mission.  This creates dissonance between 
the resources required to support a mission and the resources contained within the 
untailored UTCs.  This dissonance creates the need for tailoring, and guides the 
composition of the final deployment package.  
 One critical factor that results in tailoring is the availability of airlift.  Even as the 
Air Force has transitioned to a unit with an expeditionary mission, numerous studies have 
indicated that there may be insufficient airlift available to meet mobility requirements 
(e.g., Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001:8; General Accounting Office Report, 2000:5).  
The shortage of airlift requires that deploying units tailor their UTCs.  Indeed, it can be 
argued that with unconstrained airlift capacity, tailoring UTCs would be unnecessary. 
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 A second factor that impacts the size of a deploying UTC is the characteristics of 
the destination base.  Since UTCs are generic packages and are established as the 
maximum required supporting a wartime capability, it is assumed that there are no 
resources available at the deployed location.  However, a wide range of availability of 
lodging, sustenance, infrastructure, supplies and vehicles may be available, either through 
pre-positioning or through local businesses (Snyder and Mills, 2004: xviii).  The 
availability of resources at the deployed location determines which resources can be left 
out of the deployment package.  
 The third variable that impacts the size of the deployment package is the number 
of aircraft that are scheduled to deploy (Snyder and Mills, 2004:10).  As previously 
described, the Air Force deploys F-15E model aircraft using a series of three UTCs.  The 
first provides support for a 12 ship package.  The second provides additional resources 
required to support 18 ships.  The final provides the additional resources required to 
support 24 ships.  However, F-15Es are often deployed in quantities other than 12, 18 or 
24 ships.  When the Air Force decides to deploy F-15Es in other quantities, tailoring 
must occur. The result may be a significant modification of untailored UTCs to derive the 
actual deployment package. 
 The fourth variable that may result in UTC tailoring is whether the receiving base 
will serve as a composite location.  A composite location is “an Air Force Wing with 
several different types of aircraft assigned to the same base.” (O’Fearna, 1999:12).  If 
multiple aircraft types are assigned to a deployed location, a reduction in resources may 
be available by eliminating redundancy.  This has been identified as a significant 
footprint reduction strategy (O’Fearna, 1999:11).  
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 The duration of the deployment is a fifth variable that can affect deployment 
resource requirements.  Initial Preplanned Supply Kits, estimated fuel support and 
hospital kit requirements are built to provide a 30 day supply (Logistic’s Readiness 
Officer’s Supply Module, 2002:27).  However, planners may reduce these requirements 
if services are available locally, or other plans can lessen the need for airlift (Galway et 
al, 2002: 17).  
 Individual experiences of deployment planners also can effect the UTC selection 
and tailoring process.  “Which UTCs are deployed will vary somewhat depending on the 
judgment of the planner” (Snyder and Mills, 2004:13).  Thus, variation may occur even 
in deployments under near-identical circumstances.  In this regard, a stochastic model 
will likely be required to properly estimate potential deployment sizes since it captures 
the variance associated with deployment data. 
 The availability of prepositioned assets that are deployed from a third location is 
another important variable in determining final package size, as well.  The first source of 
assets deployed from a third location is assets from War Readiness Materials (WRM) 
stocks.  According to Air Force Instruction 25-101: 
“WRM is Service-owned resources positioned as either starter or swing stock, or a 
combination of both, to maximize worldwide war fighting capability…Starter stocks are 
those assets required at or near the point of intended use until air and sea lines of 
communications (LOCs) are capable of sustaining operations…The AF prepositions to 
support starter requirements.  Swing stocks are positioned to maximize flexibility to support 
multiple theaters… WRM is based on wartime additive requirements sufficient 
to accomplish the Two-MTW (Multi-Theatre War) strategy” (AFI 25-101, 2000:15). 
  
 Thus, WRM, as defined, are materials that are available for deployment to the 
deployed location.  These assets are not required to be shipped from the deploying 
locations and reduce the size of the deployment package. 
24 
 A second type of asset available from a third location is MAJCOM supporting 
resources.  Bare-base support kits are often available at the MAJCOM level to provide 
support.  Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle kits are examples of MAJCOM support 
resource.  Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle kit provide billeting, kitchen, hygiene 
facilities, industrial operations and flight line support for units deploying to a base that 
provides little or no support (Snyder and Mills; 2004:25).  This reduces the number of 
resources that the deploying base must provide to be self-sufficient. 
 The third type of third location support is resources that are available from a unit 
in another wing.  In the AEF construct, support and operations resources are sometimes 
deployed from different bases.  Since the deploying unit is the base supplying the aircraft, 
their required resources to support their flying operations are reduced.  This occurs 
during many AEF rotations.  An example is the AEF support given by RAF Lakenheath, 
an F-15 fighter wing.  At Lakenheath, the F-15s are tasked to support AEFs 4 and 7 (see 
Appendix 1).  However, support forces are provided in other AEFs.  The result is that 
some support functions deploying from Lakenheath do not deploy to support the 
Lakenheath F-15s, but rather support operational activities initiating from other bases.  
Additionally, when the F-15s deploy from Lakenheath, units deploy from other locations 
to provide certain types and levels of support.  The end result is and understanding that 
there are variables that affect the quantity of support deploying from a base to support a 
given mission. 
Automated Resource Estimation Tools 
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 As the Air Force transitioned to an expeditionary force, focus on the ability to 
rapidly respond to crises intensified.  The expeditionary mindset requires a faster and 
more streamlined planning process to enable sufficient force identification in short 
planning horizons (Snyder and Mills, 2004:XV).   
 Air Combat Command (ACC) establishes the planning horizon for crisis response 
as “48 hours from execute order to full deployment and full operation, after a 24-hour 
strategic warning” (Tripp et al., 1998:5).  The resulting planning window established by 
ACC is a total of 72 hours from the time of the emergence of the crisis, to the time of 
response.  The need for faster, more efficient logistics support of combat operations is 
described as Agile Combat Support or ACS (Galway et al., 2002:iii).  Numerous tools 
have been developed to estimate the deployment forces required to support a given 
deployment scenario. 
UTC-Development Tool (UTC-DT) 
 
 The UTC-DT is a tool that is intended to increase the efficiency of Air Force 
mobility operations.   
“UTC-DT will improve the development and tailoring process currently employed by the 
Air Force by quickly providing recommendations for cargo and personnel, and allowing 
multiple users at different levels the ability to work together in refining the detail to best 
fit the mission requirements.”  (Leftwich et al, 1997:25) 
 
 UTC-DT is a decision tool model that recommends types and numbers of support 
equipment using rule-sets that have been developed from allowance standards and 
interviews with actual combat units (Goddard, 2001:35).  These rule-sets are the 
recorded, quantified recommendations of field experts as discovered by several hundred 
interviews conducted by UTC-DT authors at Cannon AFB and Mountain Home AFB 
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(Goddard, 2001: 36).  These decision rules correlate the level of support with the number 
of aircraft that are tasked to deploy.    
 Information regarding personnel (from MANPER-B) and equipment (from 
LOGMOD-B) requirements are consolidated and enter the UTC-DT system.  The system 
is also consolidated with information from the Beddown Capability Assessment Tool 
(BCAT).  The BCAT provides automated details of the resources available at the 
deployed location.  The detail of WRM availability is also consolidated within the UTC-
DT database.  The rule-sets are then modified by subtracting the resources available at 
the deployed location (BCAT) and the assets available from WRM. (see Figure 4) 
 IDS 
LOGMOD-B MANPER-B
DeMS
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Assessments
Site
Capabilities
Database
WRM
 LOGCAT Data Warehouse
LOGCAT
Agent
UTC-DT
UTC-DT
Rule Base
UTC-DT
Recommendation
Database
 
Figure 4. UTC-DT Proposed Connectivity (Sjoquist, 1997:18) 
 The UTC-DT user inputs required information into the model such as date, 
Mission Designation Series, number of aircraft, sortie rate, mission type, duration of 
deployment and other items.     
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 The output of the UTC-DT is a tailored list of equipment and personnel needed to 
support a deployment under the circumstances described by the user.  This output is 
stored by UTC-DT as the equipment detail of the specific existing or created UTC.  
 There are key assumptions that may limit the applicability of the UTC-DT model 
as a significant planning tool.  Since much of the planning process is based on personal 
experiences, different planners from different places may produce a variety of listings of 
required resources.  Since the UTC-DT rule-sets are based on the inputs from planners 
from Cannon AFB and Mountain Home AFB, they are derived from a limited set of 
philosophies and experiences.  The sets may not generalize to other planners or to other 
bases.    
 A second weakness of the model is its precision.  The UTC-DT provides a 
deterministic list of resources, leaving no flexibility for situations where commanders 
may opt to take non-traditional equipment.   
 A third weakness is the reliance on BCAT data regarding base support.  The data 
in the BCAT is often inadequate and out of date (Leftwich et al, 1997:39).  Additionally, 
much of the problem with determining base support “lies in the stochastic nature of the 
quantities and availabilities of the many resources required to support air mobility 
operations” (Randall, 2004:16). 
 The reliance upon input from BCAT and WRM systems significantly reduces it 
usefulness in Deliberate Planning.  Deliberate Planning usually occurs in absence of 
detail regarding deployed location and theatre of operations.  The lack of knowledge 
about the future location of military operations requires a model that is flexible, 
providing a range of potential resource requirements. 
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 A fourth weakness associated with the UTC-DT model is that it includes only 
maintenance packages that are directly associated with the F-15E UTC.  Logistics and 
support functions not directly associated with maintenance activities were not included in 
the resource determination.  UTC-DT does not account for these resources. 
RAND/AFLMA Requirements Determination Tools.  
 The RAND Corporation and the Air Force Logistics Management Agency 
(AFLMA) teamed to create a different model for estimating resource requirements.  Their 
efforts focused on the relationship between the areas that require and provide logistics 
support: Forward Operating Locations (FOL), Forward Support Locations (FSL), and 
CONUS Support Locations (CSL).  
 The ability to support a deployment requires optimal use of each potential source 
of support.   (Galway et al., 1999:38).  Additionally, in order to optimize the mobility 
process, three crucial determinations must be made (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  Three-Step RAND Approach (Galway et al, 1999:36) 
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 The initial step is to identify the requirements of the mission.  This provides the 
nature of the deployment.  Once this has been decided, planners must identify the support 
required to satisfy the mission requirements.  Third, trade-offs and resource-reducing 
opportunities must be addressed.    
 The deployment of aircraft falls within the second phase.  Specifically, it is during 
the initial support requirements determination that mobility package size is identified.  
RAND and AFLMA have captured their decision rule sets within EXCEL spreadsheets, 
which allow for rapid resource determinations for five resource categories: “munitions, 
fuels support, unit maintenance equipment (the bulk of unit support equipment), vehicles, 
and shelter” (Galway et al., 1999:5). 
 The models for the other aircraft operate in a similar manner to the F-15E model, 
but will not be examined, as they are outside the scope of this research.  Since the scope 
of this research is to investigate the resources required to support F-15E deployments, it 
is necessary to analyze the RAND/AFLMA Minmxf15e requirements determination 
model. 
 The Minmxf15e is an optimization model geared at minimizing the resources 
required to deploy in support of an F15E deployment. 
The minimum maintenance personnel and support equipment model (an EXCEL 
spreadsheet) determines requirements for the primary maintenance activities described 
above.  The model determines aviation support package requirements by deriving 
maintenance personnel and equipment capabilities from the number of Primary Assigned 
Aircraft (PAA) tasked for deployment and other important parameters.  (Tripp et al., 
1999:89) 
 
 One of the key assumptions is that the deployed units are tasked for a “seven-day 
operation in a highly tasked environment” (Tripp et al., 1999:92).  Additionally, it 
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focuses solely on the number of aircraft to derive the resources required to support the 
package. (Tripp et al., 1999:95).   
 The rule sets that establish the base of the model were developed mostly through 
“discussion with experts in the field.  Unit-, MAJCOM-, and USAF-level functional 
experts have validated our rules and models” (Tripp et al., 1999:92).  There may be 
issues with the validity of these rule-sets, since there was no effort to ensure that the 
experiences, knowledge and capability were representative of other deployment planners.  
Thus the rule-sets may not be generalizable. 
Table 1 shows a portion of data for Air Ground Equipment (AGE) equipment 
from the model and the accompanying rule-sets for each item (Tripp et al., 1999:97).  
Thus, resources are selected to deploy based on the number of aircraft required for the 
mission.  For example, two TTU-228 hydraulic test stands will be deployed to support 12 
F-15E’s.  That number would remain unless 24 aircraft were deployed, in which case, 
four would be deployed.  This is representative of the other rule-set procedures discussed 
in this chapter.   
Table 1. Rule Sets Employed by Minmxf15e Model 
Nomenclature Description Rule-Base 
TTU-228 
Hydraulic Test Stand, 3 Phase, 
 5000 PSIG, 15 GPM 2 per 12 Acft, 4 per 24 
MHU-83 Munitions Lift Truck 2 per 12 Acft, 4 per 24 
M32A-86D 
Generator, 3 Phase, 115/200V  
or 230/400V, 400Hz 2 per 12 Acft 
MEP-105 Generator Req. 5 for Avionics support   
Data Pod 
Trailer   Req. for GBU-15 capability 
MHU-110   Included with MunMaster input 
Engine Trailer    1 per 12 Acft, plus 1 for ESTA 
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The model also initially included other resource characteristics, such as the 
number of short tons of AGE equipment required, and was later modified to include 
weight and dimensions of all associated cargo (Goddard, 2001:38). 
There are a few potential weaknesses in this model as well.  First, it only 
considers the number of deploying aircraft.  Since it ignores the potentially significant 
factors that were previously discussed, such as third location capabilities, its applicability 
may be limited.   
Similar to the UTC-DT model, the Minmxf153 model considers only associated 
UTCs, and may miss required UTCs that are not listed in the AFWUS.  Finally, its 
product is a deterministic listing of resources, providing no flexibility for different 
planning philosophies. 
Airlift Footprint Estimator (AFE) 
 A joint venture between the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory was initiated to develop the Advanced Logistics Project.    A key 
component of this project was the Mission-Resource Value Assessment Tool (M-R 
VAT); a tool designed to utilize rule-sets for calculation of the needed support equipment 
to sustain an optimal force mix for the required time frame. This tool was intended to 
validate the rule-sets created by the RAND model. 
 The goal of this project was to produce a tool to automatically build custom 
UTCs.  Rather than tailor current UTCs, the M-R VAT used valid rule-sets to build, from 
the ground up, the proper list of needed equipment and spare parts to sustain any 
conceived optimal force package (Goddard, 2001:12). The research conducted by 
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Goddard had two stated goals: identify an airlift footprint estimation function and justify 
existing rule-sets for use in the M-R VAT tool (Goddard, 2001:13). 
 In order to develop an airlift footprint estimate, the data from actual deployments 
of F-16 aircraft was collected.  A best fit line was calculated through linear regression to 
demonstrate the relationship between the number of aircraft deploying and the number of 
tons of equipment deployed. 
The final estimation model proposed by Goddard (2001) was: 
 
y =7.6x + 48.1             (1) 
 
  where   y = required short tons  
             x = number of deployed F-16 aircraft 
 Once this equation, called the Airlift Footprint Estimator (AFE), was developed, 
it was used as a baseline to compare the performance of the decision rule sets used by the 
UTC-DT and the RAND/AFLMA Minmxf16cj model.   
 The resulting evaluation of the AFE validation was that the rule sets in both the 
UTC-DT and the Minmaxf16cj should be implemented within the M-R VAT tool 
(Goddard, 2001:74).  That is their combined output was more successful in determining 
the final output of actual deployment requirement.  However, the model failed to 
combine the rule-sets to ensure that the models were not tasking redundant resources.  
This lack of information limits the applicability of the research conclusion. 
 There are a number of limitations regarding the validity of the AFE and its use as 
a basis for verifying rule-sets.  The first is that it only uses one predictor; the number of 
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aircraft.  Since numerous factors were identified in the literature, an enumeration of the 
percentage of explained variance would determine the strength of the model.  
Additionally, the model was not tested for the assumptions of regression, and R-squared 
value was provided. 
 Another potential limitation of the study is the exclusion of a statistical model to 
estimate personnel requirements.  This is significant for planning purposes, since 
personnel consume 30% of the airlift required during deployments (Galway et al., 
1999:5).     
RAND’s Strategic Tool for the Analysis of Required Transportation (START) 
 
 In 2004, the RAND Corporation published the new START resource estimator.  
This effort attempted to implement the military’s direction to Capability Based Planning 
(CBP).  CBP is a transformation initiative, directed by then Secretary of the Air Force, 
Donald Rumsfeld (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001).  The new approach to planning 
is to create a “portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force 
requirements, both functional and geographical (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001:17).  
This new way of planning will “require the United States military to develop a new 
analytic architecture” (Snyder and Mills, 2004:2). 
 The START model determines the feasibility of a list of UTCs required to support 
a given deployment and estimates the movement requirements.  Similar to previous 
models, START tailors UTCs using decision rules developed through interviews with 
functional experts and through Air Force Publication information.  Actual deployment 
data was not considered. 
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“We have not used historical deployment data as a significant input for three reasons.  
First, for most deployed sites, the nature and quantity of existing infrastructure, 
manpower, and equipment at the site are poorly documented.  Because these resources 
are needed, yet are not on the TPFDD, the TPFDD underestimates the requirements.  
Likewise, some material is not at the site and also not listed on the TPFDD, because it 
was readily available locally (for example, leasing of general-purpose vehicles).  Second, 
a large fraction of deployed UTCs are listed in the TPFDD as “**Z99” and, as such, 
contain insufficient detail for our needs.  Third, in historical deployments, the desired 
operational capability of a site may change with time, making it difficult to correlate a 
specific capability with material on the TPFDD.” (Snyder and Mills 2004:12)   
  
 The model addressed inadequate BCAT information by designating the deployed 
location as either a bare-base or a non-bare base.  While the authors concede that these 
terms are loosely defined, given the lack of current base information, topography, and 
geography, an estimation is required (Snyder and Mills 2004:6).   
 The model input screen allows for parameters to be entered into the system 
including base description (Bare or Established), operating requirement (Initial or Full), 
and a variety of potentially important support factors (see Figure 6) 
  
Figure 6. START Model Input Screen 
 Given a set of input parameters, START automatically compiles a listing of UTCs 
resembling a TPFDD. (see Table 2) 
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Table 2. Abbreviated START Output – 24-Ship Tasked to Established Base 
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY           
UL
N DESCRIPTION UTC 
UNIT 
NAME PAX 
AUTH 
PAX TOTAL WT
  24  F 15E -220 3FQK1   509 509 390.6
  PB FL SP THREAT RESP LIT TM 4F9DB   2 2 6.4
  PB FL SP THREAT RESP AUG TM 4F9DC   2 2 0
  PB FL SP THREAT RESP AUG TM 4F9DC   2 2 0
  PB FL SP THREAT RESP AUG TM 4F9DC   2 2 0
  PRIME BEEF EOD LEAD TEAM 4F9X1   6 6 11.8
  PRIME BEEF EOD FOLLOW TEAM 4F9X2   4 4 5.9
  PRIME BEEF EOD BASE SUPT TM 4F9X3   2 2 3.6
  24  F 15E HGHQ1   70 70 159.3
  SECURITY FORCES SQUAD QFEB2   13 13 5.3
  SECURITY FORCES SQUAD QFEB2   13 13 5.3
  SECURITY FORCES SQUAD QFEB2   13 13 5.3
 
 Essentially, the model selects the proper UTCs given a certain set of deployment 
parameters.  This listing is compiled using standard UTCs adopted directly from the 
MEFPAK.  Additionally, the tool allows for planning many combinations of fighter, 
cargo, special operations and reconnaissance airframes at a given location.  In fact by 
combining options for the base, mission and airframes involved in the tasking, the 
START model provides an excellent tool for UTC identification, allowing for rapid 
construction of the TPFDD. 
 However, the model considers UTCs whole, that is, it does not assist in tailoring 
UTCs.  While this can assist in rapidly developing the TPFDD during mobility 
operations, it does not solve the problems encountered in the process.   
 First, it calculates only standard UTCs.  During mobility operations, UTC 
selection is an inexact endeavor.  That is, many different UTCs may be selected to satisfy 
a resource requirement.  For example, if four Vehicle Operators, Air Force Specialty 
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Code (AFSC 2T1XX) are needed for support, then numerous UTCs can be combined or 
tailored to meet this need.  Table 3 shows the UTCs that contain 2T1XX personnel. 
Table 3. UTCs Containing 2T1XX Personnel (Vehicle Operators) 
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY       
UTC 
UNI
T TYPE NAME 
AUTH 
PERS 
NO. 
PAX 
No. 
2T1XX 
UFTSA TRN BASE SUPPORT PKG RF 33 33 9 
UFTSB TRN WG TRANSPORTATION ELE 17 17 5 
UFTSE TRN VEHICLE OPERATIONS MANAGER 1 1 1 
UFTSK TRN VEHICLE OPS SUPPORT PKG 5 5 5 
UFTSL TRN VEHICLE OPS SUPERVISOR 1 1 1 
UFTSM TRN VEHICLE OPS SUPERINTENDENT 1 1 1 
 
 As can be seen in Table 3, four 2T1XXs could be tasked by tailoring UFTSA, 
UFTSB, or UFTSK.  Additionally, they could be tasked by combining UFTSE, UFTSL 
or UFTSM.  Thus, the selection of the UTC is not as important as defining the actual 
requirement for the deployment.  In reality, it is the identification of resource 
requirements that consumes the majority of planning time, which the START model does 
not do.  
 Another issue with the applicability of the START model is that it only tasks 
aircraft packages at full-UTC levels.  (see Figure 7) 
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Figure 7. START Aircraft Selection Tab 
 As is shown in Figure 7, F-15Es can only be tasked in increments of 6.  This does 
not allow for planning deployments that are in increments other than 6.   
 Additionally, when viewing the composition of a 6-ship tasking, it selects the 
UTC 3FQKR, which is a six ship tasking that no longer exists.  It was deleted during the 
transitioned to the current, right-sized UTCs previously described.   
 Upon examination it was discovered that the MEFPAK used by the START 
model was published in December of 2001.  Additionally, attempts to update the model 
with a current AFWUS were unsuccessful.  This is probably because the EXCEL 
MACROS were designed specifically using the MEFPAK used to develop the model.  As 
a result, the model would have to be updated each time a new MEFPAK is published, and 
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the MACROs would have to be calibrated to the new data set.  Failure to update as 
needed would result in the model tasking invalid or non-existent UTCs. 
 The START model provides the foundation for a rapid UTC selection tool that 
could be used to rapidly develop a TPFDD.  However, it is not a tool that could rapidly 
determine resource requirements and it could not forecast deployment resource 
requirements. 
Summary 
 With a basic understanding of the military’s Joint Planning Process, and the tools 
used to mobilize our forces, it is apparent that a tool to estimate resource requirements 
can increase the speed and accuracy in which we respond to arising crises.  Additionally, 
flexibility and the ability to compare, evaluate and select multiple scenarios will improve 
the quality of plans that we use to go to war.  Chapter III provides a description of the 
approach used to create a stochastic resource estimator, based on historical deployment 
scenarios.  It also provides a methodology for analyzing the ability to predict resource 
requirements, and to determine the accuracy of those predictions. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
 The purpose of this chapter is to establish the basis for creating an explanatory 
model of resources used to support an F-15E deployment, and its use as a forecasting tool 
for improving transportation feasibility analysis.  First, a justification for using a 
regression model will be provided.  Second, the specific factors to be used in the 
construction of the model will be discussed, including their expected effect on the 
dependent variables.  Third, a detailed explanation will characterize the process of 
constructing the model, including the process of checking for the underlying assumptions 
of a regression model.  Finally, a detailed explanation of methodology used to test the 
validity and the accuracy of the model will be provided. 
Model Selection 
 This research design calls for a quantified relationship between several 
independent variables and a dependent variable.  A regression model accomplished this 
by quantifying the deterministic portion of a data set, and providing an interval of 
allowable error (McClave et al, 2001:458).  Additionally, since it is assumed that 
deployment planning has an error component involved, the ability to include a prediction 
interval provides a better estimate than deterministic models. 
 Regression models attempt to fit a straight line through a data set, minimizing the 
cumulative distance between the line and each data point (called a residual).  This is 
accomplished by analyzing the variance in the dependent variable related to each 
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independent variable.  The amount of error that occurs that cannot be explained by the 
independent variable, are considered to be random error. 
 In this model, a best fit line will be fit through the data set, based on significant 
variables.  This best fit line with a corresponding confidence interval will serve as a tool 
to define the explanatory power of the model.  Additionally, if the model successfully 
explains a large amount of the variance, a prediction interval can be used to forecast 
resource requirements of future deployments, given certain parameters. 
Factor selection 
 There are numerous variables that can impact the number of resources required to 
support an F-15E deployment.  These factors can increase or decrease the number of 
resources required to deploy, which requires that a robust model identify and account for 
them. 
 The first factor used in the construction of an estimation tool is the number of 
aircraft that are scheduled to deploy.  Since F-15s can deploy in varying numbers, it is 
important to relate the size of the package to the number of aircraft that it is required to 
support.  It is anticipated that the coefficient of this variable will be positive, as each 
adding aircraft will increase the required support.  This variable will be quantified using 
whole number integers corresponding to the number of aircraft. 
 The presence of other airframes at the deployed location has been identified as a 
potential factor.  Collocating different airframes at a single location, called composite 
basing, reduces the amount of resources required to support operations (O’Fearna 
1999:11).  As a result, base level planners will collaborate to determine which UTC 
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package will contain shared resources, and which UTC will have resources tailored out.  
A dummy variable is used to capture this phenomenon, where zero indicates that there 
are no other airframes present, and a one indicates composite basing.  This coefficient is 
expected to be negative, as composite basing reduces the amount of supporting resources 
by eliminating redundancies. 
 A third factor affecting the amount of resources is the characteristics of the 
deployed locations.  Following the logic employed by the RAND START model, a base 
will be identified as either a bare base, or a non-bare base, depending on the presence of 
housing, fuel, vehicles and runway equipment (Snyder and Mills, 2004:17).  Basing will 
be addressed using a dummy variable where a zero indicates a bare base and a one 
indicates a non-bare base.  This coefficient is expected to be negative, as deploying to a 
base with resources present (a non-bare base) will reduce the size of the package. 
 The duration of the deployment will also be investigated.  Many of the resources 
required to support a deployment provide support for 30 days with no resupply (Logistics 
Readiness Officer Supply Module, 2002: 27).  Following this logic, a dummy variable 
will be used to identify whether or not the deployment will last for 30 days or more.  This 
variable has a value of zero if the deployment is less than 30 days, and a value of 1 of the 
deployment is 30 days or longer.  The coefficient relating to this variable is expected to 
be positive, since a longer deployment would require more support. 
 Finally, information was collected regarding the title, type, date, and location of 
each deployment.  This additional data serves as reference to the complexity of the 
deployment, and can help serve as a reference if more detailed information is required to 
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explain non-representative data points and outliers during evaluation of the collected 
data. 
 There will be two models; one for passengers and one for equipment.  The models 
representing the resources required to support an F-15 deployment is expected to take the 
form: 
y =Β1 + Β2X1- Β3X2 - Β4X3  + ε                                        (2) 
 
  where   y = number of passenger or short tons of equipment  
            X1 = number of deployed F-15 aircraft 
    X2 = 0 if no other aircraft are present, 1 if others are present 
    X3 = 0 if deployment is under 30 days, 1 if over 30 days 
    X4 = 0 if the deployed location bare, 1 if it is not 
    ε = Random error, normally distributed with a mean of zero  
 In order to perform a regression, five or more observations are required to account 
for the degrees of freedom lost by using four independent variables. 
Building the Estimators 
 Data will be extracted from historical data files from Langley AFB, and from 
RAF Lakenheath.  Files with incomplete data were ignored. 
 Once the data iss collected, a regression determined the best fit line.  The model 
will be evaluated to ensure that it meets the underlying assumptions of regression.  If a 
model cannot meet the assumptions, then the confidence in its results is diminished.  
These four key assumptions are detailed by McClave et al (2001:498). 
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 The first assumption of a regression model is that errors are normally distributed 
with a mean of zero.  Residuals that are not normally distributed occur because there are 
non-random factors in the data set that are unaccounted for.  This can be resolved by 
transforming the data, or by identifying the additional factors. 
 The second assumption of regression is that variance of the residual’s probability 
distribution is the same for all levels of each of the independent variables.  If the variance 
of residuals is not consistent at different levels, the beta weights cannot be interpreted 
with confidence. 
 The third assumption is that the errors are independent.  If the value of a residual 
error is determined by other errors in the vicinity, then by definition it is not random 
error.  The measure of residual independence is serial correlation.  Serial correlation tests 
for correlation between neighboring residuals (McClave et al, 2001:797).  The test for 
serial correlation is the Durbin-Watson test.   
 The Durbin Watson test examines the hypothesis that there is no first order serial 
correlation in the data.  The exact sampling distribution of the Durbin-Watson test 
statistic “d” is difficult to derive.  Thus, there is no unique critical value that will lead to 
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis (McClave et al, 2001:798).  Instead of a critical 
value, a range of values is provided.  In the case of the Durbin-Watson test, a value of 2 
means that there is no serial correlation present.  However, some degree of serial 
correlation can be present and not negatively impact the performance of the model (see 
Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Durbin-Watson Critical Value Range 
 The final key assumption of a regression model is that the independent variables 
convey unique information (McClave et al, 2001:650).  That is, the variance described by 
an independent variable is unique from the variance described by other independent 
variables.  This potential redundancy in independent variables is called multicollinearity.  
A common symptom of high multicollinearity is when the overall F-test for the model 
shows a high degree of significance, but there are no significant effects.  This is because 
the independent variables combine to provide a high degree of explanation of the same 
part of the data set.   
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 Multicollinearity can be tested by examining the shared covariance between each 
independent variable, with every other independent variable in the model.  While there is 
no key statistic to determine when there is an unsatisfactory level of multicollinearity, a 
high measure of covariance, coupled with one or more factors being insignificant, 
indicates that multiple variables describe the same construct.  The solution is to remove 
one of the factors from the model and run the model with the reduced factor set. 
 In order to validate the model and compare the relative success in estimating 
resources, a 15 data points test set will be collected, using the same factors as described 
above.  These points will be entered into the models, and an assessment will be made 
regarding the effectiveness of the model’s to predict, with 95% confidence, the number of 
passengers and short tons used to support the deployment.  This will provide 
confirmation as to the power and effectiveness of the model. 
Analysis of AFE using Cargo and Passenger Models 
 Once the data has been shown to sufficiently support the assumptions of 
regression, a comparison will be made to the first generation of regressive estimator, 
proposed by Goddard (2001).  That model was constructed using a similar regression 
methodology, but used only one predictor: the number of aircraft.  Additionally, it only 
described the equipment requirements, foregoing passenger estimations.  If the cargo and 
passenger models are more effective than the AFE, it should be able to describe a 
significantly higher amount of variance. 
 Since the F-16CJ formed the basis for the exact AFE model, the methodology will 
be reapplied to the F-15E.  In this case, a regression model will be constructed using the 
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number of aircraft as the sole predictor using F15E data.  If there is not a significant 
increase in the explained variance, then using the less complicated model would be 
preferred. 
Validation of the Cargo and Passenger Models as a Forecasting Tool 
 If the cargo and passenger models satisfy the underlying assumptions of a 
regression model, that it outperforms the simple regression model presented in the AFE, 
and that it explains a large portion of the variance in resource requirements, a validation 
of the effectiveness of the model will occur. 
 This validation will be conducted using 15 additional data points collected from 
RAF Lakenheath and Langley AFB during a second data collection effort.  The 
parameters for each of these deployments will be entered into both AFE-II equations, and 
the predicted requirements will be recorded.   
 The predicted requirements will be inspected first to determine if they are within 
a calculated prediction interval.  This interval is used to determine a threshold of 
performance for the regression model.   
The basic idea of a prediction interval is thus to choose a range in the distribution of Y 
wherein most of the observations will fall, and then to declare that the next observation 
will fall in this range.  The usefulness of the prediction interval depends, as always, on the 
width of the interval and the needs for precision by the user. (Neter et al, 1996:63) 
 
 The measure of precision required in the prediction is represented by alpha (α).  
In this case, since forecasting requirements should be precise, and since a small sample 
size was used, an alpha of .05 will be used.  Conceptually, this means that out of 100 
predictions, 95 will fall within the prediction interval.  If more than 5 are outside of the 
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prediction interval, then the hypothesis that the model successfully predicts resource 
estimate with 95% confidence must be rejected. 
 The equation used in calculating a prediction interval is: 
    Yh ± t(1-α/2; n-2)s                                                            (3) 
  where   E(Yh) = The mean value of Y at point h 
            t = The value derived from the t-Distribution 
    α = The precision required in the prediction 
    n = The number of data points in the sample 
    s = An estimation of the population’s standard deviation, σ 
 This model allows the calculation of a prediction interval when using a sample 
where the population parameter σ, representing the standard deviation, is unknown. 
 The output from this equation, along with the mean regression line, will be used 
to determine whether the model is able to successfully predict, with 95% confidence, the 
resources required to support a deployment with a given set of parameters. 
 Finally, the model will be tested for the proximity of its prediction to actual 
deployment data.  Since the sample size is relatively small, a wide prediction interval will 
result.  This is because as the sample size increases, the value of the t-score decreases, 
moving the upper and lower bounds of the distribution closer to the mean line. 
 The specific methods of proximity evaluation will be the mean percentage error 
(MPE) and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of the predicted actual value.  
These provide a measure of the degree of variation between the predicted point and the 
actual value by providing a quantification of the error as a percentage of the actual. 
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 The MPE is calculated by differencing the actual and predicted amount, then 
dividing the difference by the actual.  These values are summed across predictions for 
that resource, and then averaged.  A mathematical representation of the MPE derivation 
is:  
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  where   Xi = The predicted value for point i 
                      iΧ̂  = The actual value of point i 
     i = Successive deployments from the validation set of data 
    n = The number of data points in the sample 
 The MPE provides an analytical tool to determine the ability of the model to 
predict the actual data over time.  Values of the MPE can be positive or negative.  
Negative numbers indicate a situation where the prediction understated the actual, while 
a positive number indicates that the prediction overstated the actual.  Numbers closer to 
zero indicate a small error in the prediction, while numbers farther from zero indicate a 
large error in the prediction. 
 However, since predictions that are over the actual are canceled out by similar 
predictions that understate the actual, another tool must be used to identify the absolute 
or total error created by the prediction model.  In order to determine the total average 
error created by the prediction model, a MAPE analysis will be conducted.  The MAPE is 
similar to the calculation used for the MPE.  However, a key distinction comes from 
taking the absolute value when differencing.  By accomplishing this all errors are 
determined to be positive.  This allows a determination of the total error of the model 
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since over and understated errors do not cancel out.  A representation of the calculation 
methodology is: 
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  where   Xi = The predicted value for point i 
                       iΧ̂  = The actual value of point i 
     i = Successive deployments from the validation set of data 
     n = The number of data points in the sample 
 
 A high MAPE score means that the model is susceptible to high error in its 
prediction, but provides no information regarding its tendency to over or under estimate 
actual values.  Low MAPE scores indicate a model that closely estimates actual values. 
 Since the MPE provides little information regarding the scale of the absolute 
error, and the MAPE provides little information regarding the direction of the estimation 
error, both measures will be used in unison to determine model effectiveness.  Table 4 
provides a description of the logic used to interpret MAPE and MPE values. 
Table 4. 2 X 2 Interpretation Matrix for MAPE and MPE 
  MAPE 
   Low High 
MPE Low Low Error Model High errors/cancel out 
  High Not Possible Over/Under Estimates 
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 A low MPE and a low MAPE is the result of a good model.  The error in 
prediction is low, and the model tends to slightly over and under estimate in equal 
proportions. 
 A low MPE and a high MAPE results from a model that creates high errors, but 
the errors tend to equally over and under estimate the actual value.   
 A high MPE and a low MAPE does not exist because a high MPE suggests that a 
model creates high errors in one direction, and a low MAPE suggests low errors.  These 
cannot exist simultaneously. 
 Finally, a model that produces high MPE and high MAPE is a model that creates 
large error, systematically under or over estimating the actual value.
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IV. Analysis 
Chapter Overview 
 This research began with the intention of creating a deployment resource 
estimation tool, capable of providing quick and accurate assessments of the resources 
required to support different F-15E deployments.   
 Previous chapters have provided justification of the need for rapid resource 
estimations, and have provided a context for research in this area.  Further, an 
investigation into the ability of rule-set models to predict deployment requirements has 
been addressed.   
 This chapter reports the results of the methodology introduced in Chapter III.  
This methodology works to develop a robust regression model for use in explaining the 
factors involved in determining deployment requirements that can also be used to 
forecast the composition of future deployment packages given a specific scenario.  
 Finally, an evaluation of the model is outlined using a comparison of the mean 
percentage error (MPE) and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), and an 
evaluation of the Mean Squared Error (MSE) is provided to assess the presence of large 
errors in the cargo model’s prediction. 
Data Collection 
 In all, 47 data points were collected; 32 were used in the creation of the model, 
and 15 were used during the validation of the model.  However, one of the data points 
from the set used to create the model was excluded.  It was a deployment during 2001 in 
support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM from Langley, AFB.  This movement 
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occurred during an intensely short planning period.  During the movement, no TPFDD or 
UTC data was used to drive deployment requirements.  Additionally, no information was 
available on the duration or nature of the mission.  As a result of these factors, the 
package that was deployed was larger than a full UTC movement.  Since this was an 
atypical movement that was not impacted by usual planning constraints, it was dismissed 
as an outlier.  Since the scope of this research is to estimate deployments utilizing the 
Joint Planning Process, this point was consciously omitted. 
Identification of Significant Factors 
 
 As the data were collected, information about the number of aircraft, the duration 
of the deployment and whether other airframes were collocated at the deployed site were 
readily available.  However, neither location was able to provide data from a base that fit 
the START definition of a bare base.  Thus, the bare base factor was dropped due to 
insufficient data. 
 Additionally, after examining successive outliers, another factor was identified.  
During the initial test, a succession of outliers was removed and analyzed.  In each case, 
the deployment was supporting an AEF.  After collaboration with planners at Langley 
AFB, it was determined that the AEF deployment planning process is indeed different 
from the process for planning training or wartime deployments.  First, the planning 
horizon is long, typically 14 months.  This allows for more time to consider package 
requirements.  Additionally, since the AEF movements are programmed far in advance, 
and have a very high priority, they are more likely to receive airlift support in quantities 
53 
requested.  This scenario differs greatly from the 72-hour implementation of a plan 
created using the Joint Planning Process. 
 Since the AEF planning process is conducted on a 16 month time scale, 
comparable to the deliberate planning time scale, and is executed almost exactly as 
planned, a factor to assess the significance of the AEF’s long term planning horizon was 
included.  This factor was added to the process of passenger and cargo model 
development.  To account for this factor, a dummy variable was designed, such that a 
zero meant the deployment was an AEF deployment, and a 1 meant that the deployment 
was not due to an AEF.  The coefficient of this variable was expected to be positive for 
two reasons.   
 For personnel, an AEF package was expected to be smaller because of the 
window available for training personnel.  Given a 14 month training window, personnel 
could learn to perform more tasks specific to the mission.  Additionally, since all 
personnel requirements were validated through MAJCOMs, the force numbers within 
UTCs, once tailored, are fairly stable.  This would indicate that an AEF deployment 
would reduce passenger requirements.  Finally, non-AEF deployments are often used for 
training personnel in their war time competency.  Thus, non-AEFs would theoretically 
have more personnel in them to maximize the training opportunity.  As a result, it is 
hypothesized that in an AEF deployment, less personnel would be deployed than in a 
non-AEF deployment. 
 For cargo, it was assumed that more time for planning, meant a more deliberate 
consideration of the equipment required to support a given package.  This time allows for 
planners to identify redundant or unnecessary equipment items.  Thus, it was 
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hypothesized that an AEF deployment would have less cargo than a similar deployment 
that was not in support of an AEF. 
Developing the Passenger Model 
 
 Based on the data, a regression equation was tested using the number of 
passengers as a dependent variable that responds to the values of the four independent 
variables.   
 A best fit line was determined using linear regression.   
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Figure 9. Normal Quantile Plot of Passenger Model Residuals 
 
 The first check to satisfy the underlying assumptions of regression is to ensure the 
residuals are normally distributed.  The normal quantile plot (see Figure 9) shows that the 
distribution is roughly normal, with a proportionally higher concentration of points in the 
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middle, and no points falling outside of the 95% confidence interval.  The Shapiro-Wilk 
test statistic was used to determine the fit of the residuals to a normal distribution.  The 
Shapiro-Wilk tests the hypothesis that the distribution in question and a normal 
distribution are the same.  Thus, a Shapiro-Wilk test score with a P-value of less than .05 
will result in rejecting the null hypothesis that the distribution is normal, and results in 
the model violating the regressive assumption of normality.  The Shapiro-Wilk test 
statistic for the passenger model is .978 with a p-value of .7950.  Thus the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, and the distribution is considered normal.  
 Second, a scatter plot of residuals is used to examine the equivariance of the 
residuals.  The second assumption of regression is that the variance of the residual’s 
probability distribution is the same for all levels of the independent variable.  (see Figure 
10) 
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Figure 10. Residual by Predicted Plot for Passenger Model 
 The scatter plot of residuals based on the number of passengers predicted 
provides a visual evaluation of equivariance.  Since the residuals seem to fall evenly 
around the mean, with not significant increasing or decreasing trends, the model seems to 
produce equivariant residuals.  This satisfies the second assumption of a regression 
model 
 With evidence supporting sufficient equivariance and normal residuals, an 
investigation of serial correlation must be conducted.  Serial correlation is a measure of 
dependence among neighboring data points, and was tested using the Durbin-Watson test 
for first order serial correlation.   
 The Durbin Watson test examines the hypothesis that there is no first order serial 
correlation in the data.  The Durbin-Watson test statistic and the relative critical values 
are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Serial Correlation for Passenger Model 
Model Durbin du dl 
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Watson 
Passenger 1.77 1.64987 1.198 
  
 Since the test statistic falls between du and two, the null is not rejected, and the 
assumption of no significant serial correlation is maintained. 
 The final check in ensuring a sound regression model is the check for 
multicollinearity.  As discussed in Chapter III, multicollinearity is a measure of the 
relationship between two or more independent variables; that is, do they measure the 
same thing?  A quantified assessment of shared covariance is used to determine the 
amount of shared variance between predictors. (see Table 6)  
Table 6. Shared Covariance of Passenger and Cargo Predictors 
  # AC 
Planning 
Dummy 
Duration 
Dummy 
Co-located 
Dummy 
# AC 1 0.1639 0.1669 0.2006 
Planning 
Dummy 0.1639 1 -0.5078 -0.1679 
Duration 
Dummy  0.1669 -0.5078 1 0.0486 
Co-located 
Dummy  0.2006 -0.1679 0.0486 1 
 
 As was the case in serial correlation, there are no critical thresholds to determine 
the amount of shared variance between independent variables; a visual assessment 
determines whether the presence of multicollinearity threatens the performance of the 
model. 
 In this analysis, larger numbers represent a greater amount of covariance.  The 
shared variance between the Duration Dummy variable and the Planning Dummy 
variable is high.  However, considering that both of the variables are significant in the 
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model, it isn’t high enough to determine that the variables are measuring the same thing.  
Thus, the model appears relatively free from significant covariance.  Additionally, the 
cargo formulation uses the same data, with no additional factors; the multicollinearity test 
is identical for both cases. 
 Finally, with the underlying assumption of a regression model successfully 
fulfilled, the effects of the regression equation can be investigated.   
 An investigation into the significance of each of the four independent variables 
shows that all are statistically significant contributors to the number of passengers 
deployed. (see Table 7) 
Table 7. Parameter Estimates for Passenger Model 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio 
Prob>|t
| 
Intercept 68.30149 16.60618 4.11 0.0004 
# AC 8.903698 1.182325 7.53 <.0001 
Planning Dummy (0= AEF, 1= 
not AEF) -29.6854 13.01406 -2.28 0.0317 
Co-located Dummy 
(0=no,1=yes) -24.7644 10.47851 -2.36 0.0266 
Duration Dummy (0<30, 1 >=30) 35.10655 11.06773 3.17 0.0041 
 
 Finally, an assessment of the performance is conducted by determining the ability 
of the regression model to explain variation within the data. (see Table 8)   
Table 8. Summary of Fit for Passenger Model 
R-Square 0.80709
R-Square Adj 0.774938
Root Mean Square Error 23.99245
Mean of Response 134.4828
Observations (or Sum 
Wgts) 29
 
 The passenger model explains approximately 77% of the variance in the number 
of passengers deployed.  This suggests that the four independent variables are critical to 
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providing an estimate of the number of passengers required to support a deployment.  
However, approximately 23% of the variance is not explained.  Since the 23% of 
unexplained variance in the model is considered to be randomly distributed error, a 
prediction interval will be calculated.  The prediction interval will provide a more robust 
prediction of the resources required by acknowledging an expected level of error about 
the mean.   
 The model representing the number of passengers required to support an F-15 
deployment is: 
y =68.30 + 8.90X1 - 29.81X2 - 24.76X3 + 35.11X4        (3) 
 
  where   y = number of passengers  
            X1 = number of deployed F-15 aircraft 
    X2 = 0 if no other aircraft are present, 1 if others are present 
    X3 = 0 if deployment is less30 days, 1 if 30 days or more 
    X4 = 0 if the deployment is AEF, 1 if it is not AEF 
Developing the Cargo Module 
 As with the passenger model the independent variables were used to fit a line 
through the data, minimizing the sum of the squared error terms.  An initial investigation 
into the significance of the variables indicates that one of the identified variables is non-
significant in predicting cargo requirements (see Table 9). 
Table 9.  Preliminary Parameter Estimates – Cargo Model 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio 
Prob>|t
| 
Intercept 80.85807 14.24198 5.68 <.0001 
# AC 3.981304 1.013999 3.93 0.0006 
Planning Dummy (0= AEF, 1= -64.9918 11.16127 -5.82 <.0001 
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not AEF) 
Duration Dummy (0<30, 1 
>=30) 10.3413 9.492031 1.09 0.2868 
Co-located Dummy 
(0=no,1=yes) -25.493 8.986697 -2.84 0.0091 
 
 An examination of the significance of these variables highlights the fact that the 
duration of a deployment is not a significant factor in determining the amount of cargo 
required to support a mission.  Other factors may impact this phenomenon.  For example, 
some cargo may be transported at a later date as resupply.  In any case,, the effect of the 
duration of a deployment will not be included in the cargo model.  
 The first check to satisfy the underlying assumptions of regression is ensure the 
residuals are normally distributed.  The normal quantile plot (see Figure 11) shows that 
the distribution is roughly normal, with a proportionally higher concentration of points in 
the middle, and no points falling outside f the 95% confidence interval.   
 Using the significant variables, normality of residuals was addressed.  The 
normality of the cargo data residuals was not as well defined as it was for passengers (see 
Figure 11).   
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Figure 11.  Normal Quantile Plot of Cargo Model Residuals 
 In the distribution displayed in Figure 11, all points stayed within the 95% 
confidence intervals, fulfilling the underlying requirements for normally distributed 
residuals.  Additionally, the Shapiro –Wilk score is .936 and the p-value is .077.  Since 
the Shapiro-Wilk assumes similarity between distributions, a P-value above .05 results in 
accepting the hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 
 Second, a scatter plot of residuals is used to examine the equivariance of the 
residuals.  The second assumption of regression is that variance of the residual’s 
distribution is near equal (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Residual for Predicted Plot for Cargo Model 
 
 One data point appears to defy the equivariance of the set.  Unfortunately, the 
deployment occurred in 2001, and no one in the organization remembers the deployment, 
or why it was so small comparatively.  However, regression is a robust modeling 
technique that can withstand a single point deviating from the assumption.  There does 
not appear to be a systematic variation, so the regression model beta weights are still 
acceptable. 
 The third check is for serial correlation using the Durbin Watson test.  The 
Durbin-Watson test statistics and the relative critical values are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Serial Correlation for Cargo Model 
Model Durbin-Watson du dl 
Cargo 1.4384025 1.64987 1.198 
 Since the test statistic is greater than dl the assumption that the null hypothesis 
assuming no serial correlation is accepted.  However, since there is no absolute threshold 
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dividing a high and low serial correlation, the analysis includes values between du and dl. 
This range includes values that indicate the need to exercise caution.   That is, while the 
null is accepted, meaning that the model doesn’t have serial correlation, the model shows 
a higher level than expected.  This indicates that more information may reverse the 
finding that serial correlation is present (McClave et al, 2001:799).  While this isn’t 
optimum, it does not prevent the use of the results for prediciton.  
 With assumptions necessary to apply a regression equation satisfied, the results of 
the regression equation can be investigated.  An investigation into the significance of 
each of the three remaining independent variables shows that each is a significant 
contributor to the short tons of cargo deployed. (see Table 11)   
Table 11. Parameter Estimates for Cargo Model 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio 
Prob>|t
| 
Intercept 87.56963 12.88862 6.79 <.0001
# AC 4.327508 0.966513 4.48 0.0001
Planning Dummy (0= AEF, 1= not AEF) -71.7911 9.287884 -7.73 <.0001
Co-located Dummy (0=no,1=yes) -26.6747 8.954293 -2.98 0.0064
 
 Finally, an assessment of the performance is conducted by determining the ability 
of the regression model to explain variation within the data. (see Table 12)   
Table 12. Summary of Fit for Cargo Model 
R-Square 0.73457
R-Square Adj 0.702719
Root Mean Square Error 20.65347
Mean of Response 58.55862
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 29
 
 The cargo model explains approximately 70% of the variance in the number of 
passengers deployed.  This suggests that the three independent variables are critical to 
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providing an estimate of the short tons of cargo required to support a deployment.  
However, as in the passenger model, approximately 30% of the variance is not explained.  
As a result, a model will be used to determine the mean number of short tons of 
equipment that will be deployed to support a mission, and a 95% prediction interval will 
allow for significant predictions in the midst of potential error.   
 The model for the tons of cargo required to support an F-15 deployment is: 
y =87.57 + 4.33X1 - 71.79X2 - 26.67X3                       (4) 
 
  where   y = Short tons of cargo  
            X1 = number of deployed F-15 aircraft 
    X2 = 0 if no other aircraft are present, 1 if others are present 
    X3 = 0 if the deployment is AEF, 1 if it is not AEF 
AFE Evaluation 
 Since the AFE model proposed by Goddard (2001) was constructed using only 
one factor, it has is limited in its predictive ability.  The AFE model significantly 
underperforms the more robust cargo and passenger models when tested usind the present 
data ser.  This phenomena occurs even without the AEF data that did not exist at the time 
of the AFE construction, even when it is constructed without any data from AEF 
deployments.  Its ability to explain the variance is significantly lower (.248 adjusted R-
squared) leaving a very significant amount of unexplained variance (see Table 13).  As a 
result, the model will not be investigated further, on the grounds that it does not explain a 
significant level of variance.   
Table 13. Summary Table for AFE 
R-Square 0.287791
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R-Square Adj 0.248224
Root Mean Square Error 12.12925
Mean of Response 41.17
Observations (or Sum 
Wgts) 25
 
 The increase in explained variance provides a significant argument to the cargo 
and passenger models serving as a better estimator for the resources required to support 
an F-15 deployment.  It’s inclusion of more factors provides a more flexible planning tool 
when certain parameters of the deployment may be known or when multiple scenarios are 
compared.  Finally, the passenger model provides more information critical to planning. 
Passenger and Cargo Model Validation  
 In order to evaluate the models developed in the first part of this study, a second 
set of data were collected.  These data was used to test the predictive power of the 
statistical models.  While the first part validated the ability of the models to explain the 
factors and their contributions to resource requirements, the models still needed to be 
evaluated for their performance against actual deployment data.  This validation was a 
multi-step process, testing statistically significant predictions, and the errors in the 
forecast. 
 
 A validation set of data was used in this step of the analysis.  The data test set was 
collected independently of the original data set.  The coded values of this set are provided 
in Table 14. 
Table 14. Values of the Test Data Set 
Cargo Pax #AC Aggregate Duration AEF 
76.2 141 6 0 1 1 
110.1 117 6 0 0 0 
111.2 152 8 0 0 0 
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65.7 90 8 1 1 0 
121.3 94 4 0 0 0 
61.1 77 4 1 0 0 
79.6 137 12 1 1 1 
79.2 133 12 1 1 0 
129.7 149 8 0 0 0 
134.3 157 12 0 1 0 
73.3 176 12 1 1 0 
59.9 79 4 1 0 0 
92.1 131 16 1 1 0 
76.2 182 16 1 1 1 
84.2 196 18 1 1 1 
 Assessment of Statistical Significance 
 
 To further test that the model works properly, the validation set will be used.  In 
this case the actual deployment resources will be evaluated to see if they are within the 
bounds of the models prediction interval.  Given a 95% prediction interval, a successful 
model will be able to contain the actual resource quantity within the associated interval 
95% of the time.  This assessment determines the ability of the model to perform under 
circumstances with different parameters.  That is, the model was developed using 32 data 
points, but can the model predict the actual deployment requirements using 15 data points 
from independent deployments? 
 The passenger module was able to successfully capture the actual number of 
passengers deploying in all 15 cases.  That is, in every case the actual deployment 
requirement was between the upper confidence interval (UCI) and the lower confidence 
interval (LCI). (see Table 15) 
Table 15. Passenger Model Significance 
Predicted Actual #AC AEF Duration
Co-
located LCI UCI 
Actual 
Within 
Predictio
n 
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Interval? 
92.0 141 6 1 1 0 38.7 145.3 Yes 
121.7 117 6 0 0 0 62.5 181.0 Yes 
139.5 152 8 0 0 0 79.8 199.2 Yes 
114.8 90 8 0 1 1 58.6 171.0 Yes 
103.9 94 4 0 0 0 44.8 163.1 Yes 
79.2 77 4 0 0 1 22.5 135.8 Yes 
120.7 137 12 1 1 1 69.2 172.2 Yes 
150.4 133 12 0 1 1 92.9 207.9 Yes 
139.5 149 8 0 0 0 79.8 199.2 Yes 
175.1 157 12 0 1 0 113.4 236.9 Yes 
150.4 176 12 0 1 1 92.9 207.9 Yes 
79.2 79 4 0 0 1 22.5 135.8 Yes 
186.0 131 16 0 1 1 125.7 246.3 Yes 
156.3 182 16 1 1 1 103.3 209.3 Yes 
174.1 196 18 1 1 1 119.7 228.5 Yes 
 
 This analysis shows that the prediction interval was very effective in capturing the 
actual resource requirements.  However, the meaningfulness of this test is somewhat 
limited.  For example, for the first data point, the number of passengers that would have 
been captured in the prediction interval ranged from 39 to 145.  This is a wide range that 
would not provide enough information to effectively assess transportation requirements.   
 The cargo module was also able to predict, with 95% confidence, the number of 
short tons of cargo that would be required to deploy to support and F-15 deployment.  
This indicates the success of the model in predicting resources requirements.  
Additionally, the model was provided a confidence interval that captured the actual 
resource requirement 100% of the time.  However, the results were similar to those 
produced by the passenger estimation model.  This analysis is described in Table 16. 
Table 16. Cargo Module Significance 
Predicted Actual #AC AEF Duration Aggregate LCI UCI 
Actual 
Within 
Predictio
n 
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Interval? 
39.75 76.2 6 1 1 0 0.0 85.5 Yes 
104.75 110.1 6 0 0 0 53.9 155.5 Yes 
112.71 111.2 8 0 0 0 61.5 163.9 Yes 
87.22 65.7 8 0 1 1 39.0 135.4 Yes 
96.78 121.3 4 0 0 0 46.0 147.5 Yes 
71.29 61.1 4 0 0 1 22.7 119.8 Yes 
38.15 79.6 12 1 1 1 0.0 82.3 Yes 
103.14 79.2 12 0 1 1 53.8 152.4 Yes 
112.71 129.7 8 0 0 0 61.5 163.9 Yes 
128.63 134.3 12 0 1 0 75.6 181.6 Yes 
103.14 73.3 12 0 1 1 53.8 152.4 Yes 
71.29 59.9 4 0 0 1 22.7 119.8 Yes 
119.07 92.1 16 0 1 1 67.3 170.8 Yes 
54.07 76.2 16 1 1 1 8.6 99.5 Yes 
62.04 84.2 18 1 1 1 15.4 108.7 Yes 
 
 One concern regarding the significance of these predictions must be identified.  
While the supplementary data and the corresponding significance analysis provide a basis 
for the models use and applicability, the small sample size used in the original data set 
results in wide intervals.   
 For example, in the first case, the prediction interval spans from zero to eighty-
five short tons.  This is a wide margin, leaving room for potentially large errors.  While 
this margin serves to evaluate the statistical significance of the models predictions, it 
does little to evaluate the practical significance of the predictions.  Satisfying the 
statistical significance serves as an important foundation for forecasting, the ability to 
accurately predict resource requirements is what planners need.  As a result, the model 
will be evaluated for its ability to precisely predict requirements. 
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Examination of Mean Percentage Error and the Mean Absolute Error Percentage  
 The second approach used to assess the performance of the model will be 
conducted using the mean percentage error (MPE) and the mean absolute percentage 
error (MAPE).   
 For this analysis, a value of 20% was selected to serve as the threshold between 
moderate and low error.  The threshold for high error was determined to be 30%.   
 These thresholds were selected in order to provide a very conservative evaluation 
of acceptable error in the prediction term.  Scores greater than 30%, or less and -20% are 
considered high, meaning that there is a significant amount of difference between the 
predicted and the actual resource requirements.  A score between 20% and 30% is 
considered moderate.  Scores closer to zero are considered low error.  These thresholds 
will allow for an assessment of the relative accuracy and reliability of the models to 
produce resource estimates. 
 
 
 
Table 17. MPE and MAPE Calculation for the Passenger Module 
Pax- 
Actual Pax-Predicted PE APE 
141 92.0 -34.72 34.72 
117 121.7 4.04 4.04 
152 139.5 -8.20 8.20 
90 114.8 27.52 27.52 
94 103.9 10.55 10.55 
77 79.2 2.79 2.79 
137 120.7 -11.90 11.90 
133 150.4 13.07 13.07 
149 139.5 -6.35 6.35 
157 175.1 11.56 11.56 
176 150.4 -14.56 14.56 
79 79.2 0.19 0.19 
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131 186.0 41.98 41.98 
182 156.3 -14.11 14.11 
196 174.1 -11.16 11.16 
 MPE 0.71%   
 MAPE   14.18% 
 
 As indicated in Table 17, both scores were considered low for the passenger 
module estimations, indicating a relatively high level of precision and accuracy in the 
models prediction of passenger requirements.  The model makes low errors in total 
(measured by the MAPE), and tends to over and under estimate actual requirements 
equally (measured by the MPE).  The result is a model that should prove very effective in 
predicting passenger requirements required to support and F-15 deployment in a given 
scenario. 
 With the passenger model successfully providing predictions with low errors, a 
similar exercise was conducted regarding the number of tons of cargo.  The MAPE/MPE 
analysis of the predictions provided by the cargo model can be seen in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. MPE and MAPE Calculation for the Cargo Module 
Cargo- 
Actual 
Cargo-
Predicted PE APE 
76.2 39.75 -47.83 47.83 
110.1 104.75 -4.86 4.86 
111.2 112.71 1.36 1.36 
65.7 87.22 32.75 32.75 
121.3 96.78 -20.21 20.21 
61.1 71.29 16.68 16.68 
79.6 38.15 -52.07 52.07 
79.2 103.14 30.23 30.23 
129.7 112.71 -13.10 13.10 
134.3 128.63 -4.22 4.22 
73.3 103.14 40.71 40.71 
59.9 71.29 19.02 19.02 
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92.1 119.07 29.28 29.28 
76.2 54.07 -29.04 29.04 
84.2 62.04 -26.32 26.32 
 MPE -1.84%   
 MAPE   24.51% 
 
 This model produces a very low MPE, but a moderate MAPE.  This means that 
the model has moderate estimation errors, but they tend to equally over and 
underestimate the actual values.  As such, the model successfully predicts the cargo 
requirements to support a deployment within 24 percent.  Given a moderate level of 
error, it is necessary to analyze the composition of the error between the predicted and 
actual cargo requirements.  While the MAPE/MPE analysis provided a view of the 
average errors, it did not provide enough analysis regarding the characteristics of 
individual error.  To conduct this analysis, the error terms are plotted in a distribution.  
The errors between the prediction and actual cargo requirements are shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Cargo Prediction Errors 
 These error terms indicate that most of the error terms are between -30 and 30; 
which is relatively close to the predicted quantity.  However, a few of the terms are 
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located far from the predicted quantity, both above and below the predicted level.  These 
values are magnified by plotting the distribution of the squared errors (see Figure 14).  
This may indicate the absence of another significant factor in the models. 
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Figure 14. Squared Cargo Prediction Errors 
 The squared errors indicate that most of the predictions are close to the actual 
requirements.  However, one outlier and another point call far outside the distribution.  
This means that two errors are significantly increasing the error, inflating the MAPE.  
Removing these two points significantly reduces the MAPE (see Table 19). 
Table 19. Cargo Error Evaluation Without Two Large Error Terms 
Cargo- 
Actual 
Cargo-
Predicted PE APE 
110.1 104.75 -4.86 4.86 
111.2 112.71 1.36 1.36 
65.7 87.22 32.75 32.75 
121.3 96.78 -20.21 20.21 
61.1 71.29 16.68 16.68 
79.2 103.14 30.23 30.23 
129.7 112.71 -13.10 13.10 
134.3 128.63 -4.22 4.22 
73.3 103.14 40.71 40.71 
59.9 71.29 19.02 19.02 
92.1 119.07 29.28 29.28 
76.2 54.07 -29.04 29.04 
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84.2 62.04 -26.32 26.32 
 MPE 4.817551   
 MAPE   17.85127 
 
Removing the two data points further reduces the MAPE, resulting in a model that produces low error.  
These two errors were created by deployments that occurred in 1999 and 2001 respectively.  This analysis 
may indicate that another factor has a significant impact on deployment resource requirements.  Details 
regarding the logistics planning leading up to the deployment were not available, so an analysis as to the 
reason for a large departure from other deployment data was not feasible.  Additionally, these data points 
cannot be dropped from the analysis, as they cannot be identified as non-routine, as was the case with the 
non-TPFDD data point that was eliminated.  While they cannot be dropped, this analysis reinforces the fact 
that the model generally is accurate in predicting deployment requirements with low error.   
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the findings of the research.  Each of 
the investigative questions developed for this effort are addressed and supported.  
Limitations of the research are addressed, followed by an evaluation of the results.   
Finally, topics for recommended future research are presented. 
Investigative Question One 
 
What are the significant factors determining the number of passengers and 
amount of cargo required to support a deployment? 
 The analysis was able to identify multiple factors that had a significant impact on 
the size of the final deployment package.  The number of deploying aircraft, the presence 
of other aircraft at the deployed location, and whether the deployment was in support of 
an AEF were significant factors for both the Cargo and Passenger Models.  Additionally, 
the duration of the deployment was a significant factor in determining the number of 
passengers that were required to deploy.   
Investigative Question Two  
 
How effective have previous models been in estimating real-world deployment 
requirements? 
 Due to the approach used, previous models have been largely unsuccessful in 
determining the resources that actually deploy in support of an F-15 mobility operation.  
The decision rule-sets utilized by the UTC-DT effort did not account for potential 
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differences that occur between different planners.  Additionally, its reliance on 
information from WRM and BCAT information reduces its ability to assist in deliberate 
planning.  During deliberate planning, information regarding theatre and location are 
often not specific.  Third, it does not provide predictions regarding the number of 
passengers required, missing 30% of our deployment resources required.  Finally, it only 
includes maintenance UTCs in its calculation.  As a result, it does not provide predictions 
regarding the size of the entire package, missing many of the resources required to 
support the deployment (i.e. services, transportation, civil engineering). 
 The RAND Minmx series also utilizes decision rules to predict resource 
requirements.  It also is based on the opinions of a few individuals, creating the same 
questions of whether their planning factors are representative of all planners.  
Additionally, the plan only accounts for maintenance equipment and does not provide 
passenger predictions.  Finally, it utilizes only the number of aircraft deploying as its 
planning factor.  This greatly limits its potential, as there are other significant factors that 
affect the size of the deployment. 
 The AFE developed by Goddard (2001) utilized a similar methodology as this 
research, however, its inclusion of only one significant factor results in an inferior model. 
 Finally, the RAND START model attempts to selected UTCs at the beginning of 
the planning process, speeding the time required for planning.  While it does compile 
non-maintenance UTCs, it does not provide tailoring estimates, but rather identifies full 
UTCs that may be selected for deployment.  Additionally, it only allows for fighters to be 
tasked in increments of six.  Since fighters may be tasked to deploy in intervals other 
than six, the ability to properly estimate deployment requirements is significantly 
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impaired.  Finally, the rule-sets employed by the model were based on antiquated 
MEFPAK dated from December 2001.  In fact, the F-15E packages that the tool selected 
are no longer in the inventory, having been replaced by ACC Right-Sized UTCs.  As a 
result, the START does not provide accurate resource estimates. 
Investigative Question Three 
 
Can a model be constructed that is more robust that existing models? 
 Utilizing a methodology that analyzes actual deployment data using a best-fit 
regression line, a more accurate prediction tool was developed.  The tool performed very 
well in its validation phase, producing low to moderate error in prediction.  While the 
passenger module is very effective in its predictions, the cargo is not as successful.  
Based on the analysis of error, it is possible that another factor may be involved that 
occasionally creates large differences in the resources required.   
 The presence of relatively low prediction errors, though, and provides a much 
more effective prediction tool than other models produced with this goal in mind.  While 
it is far from the final solution in deployment planning, it provides a vast improvement, 
and can contribute to more efficient planning. 
Investigative Question Four 
 
 What factors must future models account for to produce effective estimates? 
 Future models must be developed to consider all of the factors identified in the 
first question.  In addition, decision-rule sets should be created to allow for flexibility and 
individual differences planning.  Another critical factor is that future models include all 
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of the resources required to support a deployment, and not focus solely on maintenance.  
A prediction that ignores portions of the package will not produce usable results.  
Investigative Question Five 
 
  What precision and significance can a regression model provide regarding  
 resource estimations? 
 It seems that regression may be a helpful tool to use for resource estimation.  
Using the factors that were identified, it was able to produce statistically significant 
predictions in 100% of the validation data set.  Additionally, it was able to provide 
estimations regarding the amount of resources required that were either low or moderate 
in error.  In the case of passengers, the model was able to predict with 85.82% accuracy 
the number of people required to deploy.  With respect to cargo, predictions were 75.49% 
accurate in deployment requirements.  A thorough review of the literature did not 
uncover another tool that provided estimates of this precision. 
Limitations 
 The conclusions in this study have limitations that may affect the performance of 
the model.  First, this research only deals with F-15 aircraft, and does not apply to other 
airframes.  This investigation attempts to establish a methodology that could be applied 
to other necessary combat platforms (tanks, airframes, hospitals, depots, etc).  In order to 
predict the required airlift, or to hasten planning, tools would be required for each 
potential platform.  Without information regarding all other platforms, this tool is of little 
use.   
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 Second, this model does not account for items deployed from other locations to 
support an F-15 package (barriers, TALCE, etc).  This study is taken from the 
perspective of the deploying location, not from the deployed location.  As such, the 
estimations provided give information about the resources that needs to be moved to a 
location, but no information regarding the resources needed for support at that location.  
This methodology fails to give exact resource estimation, but provides a flexible range 
for planners to use when planning to mobilize forces.  As a result, the model does not 
provide specifics regarding what resources will be deployed, only an aggregate 
estimation regarding how much is required. 
 Third, this model was developed using a very small sample size.  While it meets 
the minimum size required for the number of variables tested and predicts well given a 
set of test data, the beta values of the variables may be significantly changed if a larger 
data set was collected.  In a similar fashion, the data was collected from two bases over 
the last five years.  It is possible that local policy or ingrained organizational habits have 
a significant effect on the results.  It is possible that the data collected is not 
representative of other F-15E bases.  Additionally, since data were not included for all 
aircraft quantities (e.g. 1, 3, 5 or 25 aircraft deployed) extreme caution must be exercised 
when using the model to predict deployments in these quantities. 
 Finally, this model does not attempt to reduce, direct or optimize the deployment 
package.  The scope of this research was to explain what actually happens.  As a result, 
inefficient planning may be accepted as the norm.  This model made no attempt to change 
the tailoring process, only to quantify it and use that analysis to streamline planning. 
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Implications 
 
 This research shows that accurate planning factors can be developed using 
statistical methods.  In turn, this methodology can be used to improve the Joint Planning 
Process.  First, rapid COA comparisons can occur.  This allows for more accurate 
transportation feasibility assessments to occur early in the planning process.  As a result, 
feasible COAs will not be dismissed as a result of poor planning factors.   
 Additionally, accurate airlift requirements can be developed early in the planning 
process.  This would allow for HQ USTRANSCOM to begin scheduling early in the 
process, before tailoring occurred at the base and MAJCOM level.  By using planning 
factors that closely match actual deployment requirements, the planning process will be 
more accurate, quick, and will better support our expeditionary posture. 
Future Research 
 Future research is required to develop and architecture for making transportation 
feasibility analysis more accurate and rapid.  In order to develop this architecture, other 
deployable platforms will have to be identified and quantified if an accurate picture of all 
of the airlift requirements is to be developed.  While it is beneficial to have accurate 
information regarding the F-15E, it does little to determine the feasibility of plans that 
contain other capabilities. 
 Additionally, other significant factors could be identified and added to the 
regression models as independent variables.  While this research provided a large 
explanation of the variance in deployment resources, an additional factor or two may 
reduce the error in prediction that these models produce. 
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 Similarly, future research could seek to reproduce these results using ordinal, 
discrete or continuous variables, rater than dummy variables.  By elaborating the 
duration, type of deployment, or type of platform that is collocated, a more robust 
explanation of variance may be found. 
 Finally, future research could be developed to combine the decision rule-set 
approach with the regression results.  By combining these methodologies, it is possible to 
provide both a prediction tool, and an automated tailoring tool that closely estimates the 
actual resource requirements.  By combining these approaches, efficiency would be 
gained by combining the planning at the Joint level, and the time to tailor UTCs that 
occurs at the base level. 
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Appendix A: RAF Lakenheath AFWUS 
UTC UNIT ORIGIN PAX Cycle 5 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF01 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF01 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF01 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF01 
9ACP5 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 3 AEF01 
9ACZZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF01 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF03 
9ACP1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 3 AEF03 
9ACP4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF03 
9ACP7 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 0 AEF03 
6KAAE 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
6KTD0 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
9AAGG 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 5 AEF04 
9AEMP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 10 AEF04 
9AEMP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 10 AEF04 
9AEMP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 10 AEF04 
9AEMQ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 5 AEF04 
9AMEA 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
CSFAL 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
CSFAN 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 0 AEF04 
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CSFAP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 3 AEF04 
HFZZZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 4 AEF04 
RFGAE 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFC1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFC1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFC2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFC2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFC4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF04 
XFFG1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFG2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFG2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFG7 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFGZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFJ3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF04 
XFFJ3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF04 
XFFJ3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF04 
XFFJ8 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF04 
XFFJP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XFFJP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XSMA1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XSMA2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
UTC UNIT ORIGIN PAX EAFC5 
XSMA3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XSMA3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XSMA3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XSMA4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
XSMA6 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF04 
9ACP5 0048FTRWG LAKENHEAT 3 AEF05 
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H 
6KAAE 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
6KAAE 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
9ACP5 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 3 AEF07 
9AEMP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 10 AEF07 
9AEMP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 10 AEF07 
9AEMP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 10 AEF07 
9AEMQ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 5 AEF07 
CSFAK 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
CSFAL 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
CSFAL 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
CSFAL 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
HFZZZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 4 AEF07 
RFBZZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
RFGAE 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFC1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFC1 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFC2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFC2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFC3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFG2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFG2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFG6 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFGZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFJ3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF07 
XFFJ3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF07 
XFFJ3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 2 AEF07 
XFFJJ 0048FTRWG LAKENHEAT 1 AEF07 
84 
H 
XFFJP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFJP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFJP 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XFFJZ 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XSMA2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XSMA3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
XSMA3 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF07 
9ACP2 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 3 AEF09 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF10 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF10 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF10 
6KDB4 0048FTRWG 
LAKENHEAT
H 1 AEF10 
85 
References 
 
Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) Familiarization Course. Unpublished 
 presentation.  Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center Education, Training, 
 and Partnership Branch, 15 Apr 2003. 
 
Department of the Air Force. Logistics Readiness Officers Course, Logistics Plans 
 Module, Joint Planning. HQ USAF/ILXG, 09 Sep 2002.   
 
Department of the Air Force. Logistics Readiness Officers Course, Supply Module, 
 Contingency Operations. HQ USAF/ILXG, 09 Sep 2002.   
 
Department of the Air Force, War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Program Guidance and 
 Procedures. AFI 25-101. HQ USAF/ILXX, 25 Oct 2000. 
 
Department of the Air Force, Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning.  AFI 10-400. HQ 
 USAF/XOXW, 16 Oct 2002. 
 
Department of the Air Force. Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and 
 Implementation. Air Force Manual 10-401, Volume 1. HQ USAF/XOOW, 19 
 May 2003. 
 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC:Office of 
 the Secretary of Defense, Sep 2001. 
 
Department of Defense. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Joint Pub 5-
 03. Washington, HQ DoD, 1997. 
 
Galway, Lionel A. Timothy L. Ramey, Paul S. Killingsworth, John G. Drew, and C. 
Chris  Fair.  “A Global Infrastructure to Support EAF,”  Air Force Journal of 
 Logistics: 2-38 (Summer 1999). 
 
Galway, Lionel A, Mahyar A. Amouzegar, Don Snyder, Richard Hillestad.  
 Reconfiguring Footprint to Speed Expeditionary Aerospace Forces Deployment.  
 Santa Monica: RAND, 2002.  
 
General Accounting Office. Military Readiness: Air Transport Capability Falls Short of 
 Requirements.  GAO/NSIAD-00-135, June 2000. 
 
Goddard, Matthew, W.  Estimating Deployed Airlift and Equipment Requirements for 
 F-16 Aircraft in Support of the Advanced Logistics Project. MS Thesis, 
 AFIT/GLM/ENS/01M-11, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of 
 Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, Mar 2001. 
86 
 
 
Griffis Stanley E. and Joseph D. Martin. Development and Analysis of a Dual-Role 
 Fighter Deployment Footprint Logistics Planning Equation.  MS Thesis, 
 AFIT/GLM/LAP/96S-4, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of 
 Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, Sept 1996. 
 
Joint Chief’s of Staff. User’s Guide for JOPES. 1 May 1995.  
 
Leftwich, James and Michael Shaw.  Final Technical Report/Study Services for Unit  
Type Code-Development and Tailoring (UTC-DT). Washington DC: Synergy Inc, 
1997. 
 
McClave, James T, Benson, P. George and Terry Sincih.  Statistics for Business and 
 Economics.  New Jersey.  Prentice Hall, 2001. 
 
Neter, John, Kutner, Michael H, Nachtsheim, Christopher J and William Wasserman.  
 Applied Linear Statistical Models.  New York.  McGraw-Hill, 1996. 
 
Nowak, Michael J.  The Air Power Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain 
Future? AWC Paper AU/AWC/178/1999-04, Air University, Maxwell AFB, 
Montgomery, Al. April 1999 
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/awc/99-178.pdf. 
 
O’Fearna, Frank, C. Reduction of the Aircraft Ground Equipment Footprint of an   
  Expeditionary Force.  MS Thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-14.  School of Systems  
  and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB  
  OH, March 1999. 
 
Randall, Christian, E.  An Analysis of the Impact of Base Support Resources on the 
 Availability of Air Mobility Command Aircraft.  MS Thesis, AFIT/GLM/ENS/04-
 15.  School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), 
 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, March 2004. 
 
Snyder, Don and Patrick Mills. Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces: A 
 Methodology for Determining Air Force Deployment Requirements. Santa 
 Monica: Rand, 2004. 
 
Tripp, Robert S., Lionel A. Galway, Timothy L. Ramey, and John G. Drew.  Enhancing 
 the Effectiveness of Expeditionary Aerospace Forces Through Integrated Agile 
 Combat Support Planning.  Santa Monica: RAND, 1999. 
 
 
 
87 
Vo, Tam, T. Exploratory Analysis of the Deployment Feasibility of United States Air  
  force Expeditionary Forces.  MS Thesis, AFIT/GLM/LAL/97S-8. School of  
  Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson  
  AFB OH, September 1997. 
88 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, 
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of 
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
18-02-2005 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Sep 2004 - Mar 2005 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
ESTIMATING RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT MULTI-
ECHELON F-15E DEPLOYMENTS 
 5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Maxwell, David R., Captain, USAF 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Street, Building 642 
 WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
AFIT/GLM/ENS/05-16 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
CHRISTIAN E. RANDALL, Capt, USAF  
AFRL/HEAL Logistics Research Officer  
2698 G Street, Building 190  
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7604  
DSN: 986-4145  Comm: 937-656-4145 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
              APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
14. ABSTRACT  
     Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has become focused on developing the capability to rapidly respond to 
emerging crises.  Strategic and operation planning play key roles in order to effectively implement this concept.  During the 
planning process, separate courses of action (COAs) are developed.  These COAs are evaluated based upon their operational effect, 
resource availability, nuclear and transportation feasibility.   
     Currently, transportation feasibility assessments are based on the resources contained within a full Unit Type Code (UTC).  
Some COAs are eliminated based on these factors.  However, most deployments occur at reduced levels.  Situational factors, such 
as the number of aircraft, type of deployment, duration of the deployment, and availability of resources from other locations, can 
significantly reduce the logistics footprint of a deploying base. 
     Additionally, full-UTC planning factors reduce the planner’s knowledge of airlift requirements until information regarding 
tailoring is returned from the base.  As a result, precious time is consumed, and potentially favorable COAs may be eliminated 
erroneously. 
     By developing a forecasting tool to identify the critical factors in tailoring, and their effect on the size of the package deployed, 
planners can quickly evaluate deployment scenarios, providing more accurate assessments regarding plan feasibility and 
transportation supportability. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Mobility, Deployment, Forecasting   
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr William Cunningham, USAF (ENS) 
a. REPORT 
 
U 
b. ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS PAGE 
 
U 
17. LIMITATION OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
 
98 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565, ext 4283; e-mail:  wcunning@afit.edu 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
